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ABSTRACT 
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CLASS AND CONSTRUAL LEVEL 
 IN SOCIAL JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS BELIEFS 
MAY 2017 
PRERANA BHARADWAJ,  
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 
M.S., HUNTER COLLEGE 
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Ronnie Janoff-Bulman 
 
What predicts support for the redistribution of resources to improve socioeconomic inequality? 
Social class, or the subjective perception of one’s resources and position in relation to others in a 
larger society, was examined as one relevant characteristic. Across four experiments, social class 
as subjective social status was manipulated (two) and measured (all four), and found to have a 
significant negative effect on support for the moral values of group-based equality (social justice) 
but not on individual deservingness (fairness) separate from political identity and other 
demographic characteristics. This effect was seen on stated principles but particularly relevant in 
approval ratings of conflict scenarios in which social justice is violated in favor of fairness such 
as in instances counter to Affirmative Action policies. Using an abstract/higher construal level or 
“big picture” style of thinking (measured in all four studies and manipulated in two studies) 
independently predicted objections to the violations of social justice but not fairness in such 
scenarios. Socioeconomic inequality has undeniably poor consequences for a society and 
understanding the psychological perspectives of those along the social class continuum, 
particularly those in power towards the top, may be a step towards alleviating such inequality.  
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CHAPTER 1 
SOCIAL CLASS, SOCIAL JUSTICE & FAIRNESS 
A. Introduction 
In an April 2015 Gallup poll of over 5,000 adults across the US, participants 
responded to questions about inequality and income distribution with unexpectedly mixed 
results (Newport, 2015). Overall, 46% of Americans did not believe income and wealth 
are distributed fairly and did support the government taxing the rich to reduce the 
inequality. Conversely, 25% believed the distribution is acceptable and that taxing the 
rich is not necessary. However, when considering perhaps the most relevant characteristic 
of these respondents to these questions on economic inequality--their socioeconomic 
status--these beliefs shifted towards two poles of increased and decreased support for 
wealth redistribution. Thus, broken down by income, 41% of those who earned over 
$75,000 annually believed the national income distribution was acceptable, while this 
was true of only 26% of those who earned under $30,000. Of those who opposed the 
current income distribution, 61% of low-income participants supported taxing the rich to 
resolve the issue, while this was true of only 43% of higher income participants. The 
differences in these numbers between high- and low-income participants could be 
accounted for by self-interest. After all, the poor would benefit from income 
redistribution policies, while the rich would be averse to the costs they would presumably 
incur. Indeed, the differences between the numbers would probably be even greater if 
income brackets above $75,000 were isolated. However, the numbers are clearly not 
explained by self-interest alone: Who are the 26% of low-income individuals who 
believed the income distribution was acceptable, and the 59% of high-income individuals 
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who found the distribution unfair? What motivations and contexts explain the 43% of 
high-income participants who would tax the rich to even the distribution, at presumed 
cost to themselves? If self-interest is not the primary motivation for these beliefs, what 
is? The following review of literature in social psychology examines proposed 
explanations for why high- and low-social class would predict increased or decreased 
support for economic redistribution. 
Social justice is the phrase used to capture the moral value supporting the 
redistribution of resources to achieve large-scale equality across groups in society. Like 
other values, social justice is shaped by long-term contexts. The specific relevant context 
addressed here is social class, which is the subjective experience of socioeconomic status 
(SES) relative to others in a social hierarchy, often measured as a combination of wealth, 
education, and occupational prestige (Saegert, Adler, Bullock, Cauce, Liu, Wyche, 2007). 
Research suggests that both objective measures and subjective perceptions of SES can 
influence several types of moral judgments, but less is known about the effects of one’s 
own socioeconomic status on specific moral judgments of economic and social inequality 
(Kraus, Piff & Keltner, 2011).  
In understanding beliefs about socioeconomic inequality, socioeconomic status is 
likely to be a valuable and important predictive variable. Over the last 50 years in the US, 
the income gap between high socioeconomic status groups and low socioeconomic status 
groups has only widened. This is significant because low SES has been shown to have 
immense negative permanent and cyclical psychological and physiological consequences 
for society, such as increased chronic stress, increased health risks, neural changes 
decreasing short-term memory, and decreased academic and professional success 
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(Saegert, et al., 2007). In aiming to understand and perhaps thereby reduce that 
inequality, SES is also an important variable to consider because of the strong influence 
high SES individuals have on important societal domains, including education (what is 
taught), research (what is studied), business (which companies and people profit), and 
politics (which policies are upheld). Research at the intersection of social class and 
beliefs about inequality is important as it may be helpful for resolving some of the issues 
that come with severe socioeconomic inequality on the national level.   
As a step towards conducting research to alleviate the consequences of 
socioeconomic inequality, the following literature review will begin by defining 
socioeconomic status, social class, and social justice, especially in relation to associated 
but separate concepts. Next, existing social psychological research on the influence of 
social class/socioeconomic status on endorsement of social justice values and beliefs will 
be reviewed. The examined studies will be divided into four sections that answer the 
following questions: how high social class would predict low support for social justice, 
how low social class would predict high support for social justice, why high social class 
might predict high support for social justice, and why low social class might predict low 
support for social justice. The latter two sections contradict expected self-interest 
motivations and, in fact, involve fewer as well as conflicting findings, leaving 
unanswered the question of why the expected self-interest motivations may be violated. 
Thus, in the final section, four studies establishing the direct relationship between social 
class and beliefs about inequality and meritocracy, and testing a conceptual 
mediator/predictor, will be presented that attempt to bring the incongruous research 
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together into a cohesive model better explaining the influence of social class on social 
justice beliefs.  
B. Defining Social Class 
As a specific form of status, social class is complex, so it is important to begin by 
reviewing the social psychological understanding of “status” as a general concept. 
Although studies have historically conflated status with other related characteristics, such 
as “power,” recent research has sought to better clarify these traits. A current and 
comprehensive understanding of status was explored in a chapter on Interpersonal 
Stratification (Fiske, 2010). Here, Fiske posits that status differs from other related 
concepts because it is granted externally by those without status. Power, for example, 
may be earned individually, and hierarchy can be defined by a system, but status is 
uniquely a social and cultural phenomenon. Thus, Fiske suggests that status is 
specifically composed of such intangible resources as “social respect, recognition, 
importance, and prestige” resulting from position at the top of a social hierarchy (Fiske, 
2010). Power, in contrast, has been defined as control over important outcomes and 
resources such as income or social inclusion (Blader & Chen, 2012). In relation to social 
justice, status may be more relevant than power as most people do not have great direct 
control over the redistribution of resources, but status, especially socioeconomic status, is 
both more common and more measurable, as well as central to one’s beliefs about the self 
and others.   
Socioeconomic status (SES), the objective measure of social class, is measured as 
a combination of factors including education, income, and occupational prestige that 
coalesce to represent a single concept regarding position in a social hierarchy (Saegert, et 
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al., 2007). SES is unique from other markers of social status such as race, gender, and 
age. All of these forms of status often have externally visible elements; SES, on the other 
hand, is a more concealed form of status. Moreover, SES achieves altogether what race, 
gender, and age do individually: SES separates society into defined groups that determine 
specific roles, while presumably allowing for mobility between groups. Still, like race 
and gender, SES falsely suggests achievement through internal factors. Although high 
SES certainly can be earned through education and/or professional success, it may also be 
conferred through fortunate birth, making assumptions of positive internal qualities just 
as spurious. 
Besides positive consequences such as access and agency, status is especially 
associated with perceived competence. Indeed, surveys administered to 20 international 
samples found that measures of societal status were highly correlated with perceived trait 
competence (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002). Part of the proliferation of using status to 
infer competence and other positive qualities may lie in the ease of visually recognizing 
status over traits that require effortful testing, such as ability (Fiske, 2010).   
People immediately acknowledge status hierarchies through nonverbal, verbal, 
and attitudinal routes. High-status people generally do (a) express freely (more 
facial activity, posing skill), (b) relax more (open body, calm voice, vocal 
stability), and (c) intrude more (direct gaze, closer interpersonal distance, more 
interruptions, louder voices). (Fiske, 2010) 
Highly visible, persons with high status are then associated with other positive qualities 
that grant privilege in many ways – a process labeled status characteristics theory 
(Ridgeway, 2001).  
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Thus, status is perceived socially. Ridgeway & Erickson (2000) show the strength 
of this status construction in studies where subjects developed shared status beliefs about 
a group through nonverbal cues. In these studies, participants were all assigned to the 
same group, which was supposedly paid a different amount for their participation than 
another group (confederates). When participants and confederates were brought together 
to make some decisions as part of the task, confederates either interacted with 
participants in a “hesitant, uncertain, and deferential” manner (higher status condition) or 
in a “confident, certain, and assertive” manner (lower status condition). In the higher 
status condition, participants observed these nonverbal indications of their own 
importance, inferred their own high status, and assumed they were paid more. In the 
lower status condition, participants inferred their own inferiority and assumed they were 
being paid less.  In a subsequent study, the participants transferred these understandings 
of status to third-party observers through their behavior. Thus, as group members are 
observed to have some social advantage over others, beliefs about their deservingness are 
also formed and, in a self-fulfilling prophecy, a hierarchy is established. 
Once status is constructed and communicated, how is objective status maintained? 
First, according to meta-analyses, ingroup bias tends to be higher among high-status 
groups, and this mechanism serves to keep the same groups at the top over time 
(Bettencourt, Charlton, Dorr, &   Hume, 2001). A company’s leadership, for example, 
tends to “network, attract, hire, socialize, and appreciate similar others, from job-hunting 
onward” (Fiske, 2010). On a societal level, resources accorded to high SES individuals 
can easily be passed on to their children and close others – legacy admissions at a 
university and estate planning being prime examples. Simultaneously, the consequences 
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of low status can be perpetuated by lower quality schools in low-income communities, 
the health effects of chronic stress caused by limited resources, and, recently, the findings 
that poverty alters the brain in ways that can affect academic success (Mani, 
Mullainathan, Shafir & Zhao, 2013; Shonkoff, Boyce & McEwan, 2009; Smith, Brooks-
Gun & Klebanov, 1997).  In fact, although SES has been theoretically purported to allow 
for mobility between groups, it is far more common for people to remain in their category 
for generations and perpetuate inequality while also grossly overestimating the possibility 
of social mobility (Causa & Johannsen, 2011; Kraus & Tan, 2011). This long-term and 
pervasive establishment of the socioeconomic status hierarchy thus has consequences for 
a person’s beliefs about his or her own place in society and the extent to which this 
position is deserved or needs revision. 
Finally, SES categories have been studied as cultural groups, with specific 
behaviors and tastes distinct to upper versus low status groups that are learned and 
strengthened the way other cultural markers are (Kraus, Piff & Keltner, 2011). Examples 
of these markers may be physical, such as weight, behaviors, such as dental hygiene, or 
tastes, such as music and fashion brands, among many others. Essentially, the objective 
measure of SES generally translates into signals of status such as aesthetic preferences 
and social behavior that, in turn, form the basis of the subjective experience of social 
class (Kraus, Piff & Keltner, 2011).  
Interestingly, measures of status differentially affect outcomes depending on 
whether the measure is objective or subjective. A laboratory study of healthy women 
showed that subjective perceptions of their own status were better predictors of 
psychological and physiological health outcomes including stress levels, general affect, 
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and heart rate (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo & Ickovics, 2000). These predictions went above 
and beyond the effects of objective measures of their income and education, providing 
further support for the social psychological nature of social class and its effects. 
Essentially, the subjective component of social class (referred to as Subjective Social 
Status, SSS) is largely rooted in social comparison, not discrete income quintiles, and 
understanding of rank relative to others is a key element. Importantly, social class has 
been defined as an essential part of the self, affecting everyday interactions, large 
institutional and systemic processes, individual self-worth, and engagement with others 
(Reay, 2005). Hereafter, mentions of social class will refer to the psychological 
experience and effects of varying levels of SES and SSS.    
C. Defining Social Justice and Fairness 
One important aspect of social class is the reluctance many people feel to discuss 
it, laden as it is with the weight of self- and others’ worth, as well as strong emotions 
such as embarrassment and shame (van Eijk, 2012). Regrettably, the consequence of 
class being taboo is invisibility: economic inequality can be denied, the needs of those 
with low status can be ignored, and people at the bottom of the hierarchy seldom 
recognize their own disadvantage and are unlikely to rally in support of change while the 
income gap only increases (Sanders & Mahalingam, 2012). Nevertheless, issues of SES 
are invariably related to the distribution of resources in a society – and opinions about 
this from a moral perspective may be interestingly telling about the effects of status and 
class on moral psychology.  
Two major and competing rules for how we should allocate resources can be 
referred to as fairness and social justice. Fairness involves input-based deservingness and 
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results in outcomes based on proportionality.  In contrast, Social Justice involves 
deservingness based on common group membership and results in outcomes that are 
relatively equal across the group.  Fairness is based on an individual or group’s specific 
effort, work, or contributions, whereas Social Justice is based in communal sharing of the 
group’s resources; here a person is entitled to distributions as a member of the group 
(Bharadwaj & Janoff-Bulman, in preparation).  
The two rules have a moral component, as presented in the Model of Moral 
Motives (MMM), (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013). In MMM, distinct moral principles 
are derived by turning to a fundamental motivational distinction, approach versus 
avoidance, and crossing these orientations with three foci of moral concern: the self 
(intrapersonal), the other (interpersonal), and the group (collective). Approach-based 
morality, or prescriptive morality, emphasizes positive, selfless behaviors, whereas 
avoidance-based morality, or proscriptive morality, is restrictive and involves restraining 
negative, self-interested behaviors (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009).  Fairness is 
the result of applying the approach-based morality to the interpersonal domain. A key 
extension of moral principles in the MMM involves the group-focused, or binding, 
moralities, of which social justice is the component associated with prescriptive morality.  
Fairness and Social Justice can easily come into conflict. The method referred to 
as fairness uses input-based deservingness to allocate resources. However, resources 
allotted according to individual merit can result in an unfair distribution of such resources 
on the group level. Such a distribution would violate values of social justice, which allots 
resources on the basis of group membership. For instance, allocating funding to schools 
based on the individual incomes of students’ families would result in an unequal 
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distribution of funding across schools situated in high- and low-income communities. 
Allocating funding in accordance with social justice would pool money sources (e.g., 
property taxes, donations, etc.) across a city or state and would divide the proceeds 
relatively equally across schools.    
The past work closest to this understanding of fairness and social justice is a 1981 
paper by Brickman and colleagues (Brickman, Folger, Goode, & Schul, 1981), in which 
they distinguish between microjustice and macrojustice. Microjustice requires and 
involves individual recipients, whereas macrojustice involves the aggregate distribution 
of rewards in society. This theoretical chapter explains that in various situations, treating 
individuals in accordance with microjustice may produce what seems to be an unjust 
distribution of rewards among groups. Moreover, Brickman and colleagues present 
evidence demonstrating that although people may initially use microjustice to make 
decisions, they are unhappy when this rule results in negatively skewed distributions 
across groups (Brickman, et.al., 1981). Thus, fairness is akin to Brickman et al’s (1981) 
microjustice, and social justice is akin to macrojustice.  
Distinguishing between these two rules of distributive justice--individual 
deservingness and group-based equality--has been explored in the past more theoretically 
than empirically. Sampson (1975) puts forth the concept of “justice as equality” and 
suggests that “equality” and “equity” often conflict in the real world, but individual and 
contextual differences may predict which is valued in any given situation. Cohen (1987) 
expands on this distinction but makes a clear argument for the necessity of empirical 
research as there are a number of confusing conceptual frameworks and terms that 
encompass what he refers to as rules of distribution that either do or do not differentiate 
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between individuals by some level of input. Wenzel (2004) picks up this thread but 
emphasizes the role of group membership in his chapter dedicated to a “social 
categorization approach to distributive justice” wherein two empirical studies suggest that 
identifying with a subgroup predicts greater preference for equality over self-interest. 
Research on social justice as a moral value is limited, but some preliminary 
studies suggest that it is indeed distinct from fairness, as well as aligned with lay 
understanding of the concept of social category-based equality. In an exploratory study, 
Bharadwaj and Janoff-Bulman (in preparation) asked 70 college students to give 
examples of fairness and unfairness or social justice and social injustice. Independent 
coding revealed that when asked about fairness and unfairness, participants used more 
words involving a collection of unrelated people, reciprocity, proportionality, and 
specific events such as sharing the cost of a meal; when asked about social justice and 
social injustice, participants used more words about people in social categories, instances 
of discrimination or prejudice, ongoing phenomena such as the fight for gay marriage or 
the Black Lives Matter movement, and group membership.  
In another study, five-item measures of Fairness and Social Justice were 
developed to assess the degree to which they may be related or orthogonal. The five-item 
Fairness Scale was adapted from the Preference for the Merit Principle Scale (PMP; 
Davey, Bobocel, Hing, Zanna, 1999). Five items that specifically endorsed rules for 
rewarding individual contribution were chosen from the PMP to create the Fairness 
Scale. The statements were rewritten to reflect groups in society and vague rewards, 
rather than the original words that specified pay in a workplace environment. Examples 
of statements in the Fairness Scale include: “In society, people who do a good job ought 
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to rise to the top” and “The effort a person puts into something ought to be reflected in 
the size of the reward he or she receives” [see Appendix A for full scale]. Participants 
also completed the five-item Social Justice scale from the Model of Moral Motives 
(Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013, 2014).  Examples of statements in the Social Justice 
Scale include “In the healthiest societies, those at the top should feel responsible for 
improving the wellbeing of those at the bottom” and “It is our responsibility, not just a 
matter of personal preference, to provide for groups worse off in society” [see Appendix 
B for full scale]. A filler task was included between the measures of Fairness and Social 
Justice: participants completed 14 items from the Carver and White’s (1994) Behavioral 
Inhibition/Activation Scale. The scales were counterbalanced and administered to 202 
participants: across both time points, Fairness and Social Justice scores were uncorrelated 
with no order effects, suggesting that they are both independent moral values that people 
can endorse simultaneously. 
In general, self-interest motivations would suggest that high social class should be 
associated with greater preferences for fairness over social justice when the two are in 
conflict, whereas low social class would be associated with the opposite. Because this 
association has not been directly tested, the following review will serve to inform the 
proposed dissertation studies regarding the factors beyond self-interest that matter when 
predicting the influence of social class on preferences for social justice versus fairness.  
D. Social Class and Social Justice – Literature Review 
1. High Social Class Predicts Low Support for Social Justice 
A major theme of research on status is the desire for those with high status to 
maintain their position, and for those with low status to move up in the world (Fiske, 
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2010). This can be explained by the value of status, which is immediate and socio-
biological in nature in that it coordinates interactions by allowing those with high status 
to command attention, bind groups together, and command deference (Chance & Jolly, 
1970). In the long-term and at the group level, status “opens doors,” conferring agency, 
choices, resources, and the ability to impart such position to offspring and ingroup 
members (Fiske, 2010).  
Considering these advantages, self-interest in gaining and maintaining status should 
be high and several lines of work suggest that this is indeed the case. More specifically, 
research on SES and concepts associated with the distribution of resources in society 
suggests that, in general, people think, feel, and act in ways that allow them and their 
ingroup members to maintain status in a social hierarchy; they should, by extension, not 
support social justice.  
Relatively abundant resources and elevated rank afford upper-class individuals 
increased control over their lives, reduced exposure to external influences, and 
more personal choice, all of which promote greater independence and self-focus 
(Piff, 2013).  
Foremost, cognition and beliefs associated with high SES include the cognitive 
simplicity of hierarchy, beliefs about deservingness, support of a meritocracy, beliefs in 
essentialism, and denial of inequality in the pursuit of status, all of which are discussed 
below. These characteristics of the upper class would rationally be associated with a 
greater tolerance for inequality and less support for social justice over fairness as a moral 
value.  
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First, hierarchy (versus egalitarianism and, by association, social justice) appears 
to be the cognitively simpler and more basic concept for all, regardless of social class; 
hierarchical relationships are understood developmentally earlier, faster, and more easily 
than egalitarian relationships (Van Berkel, Crandall, Eidelman & Blanchar, 2015). Under 
several types of cognitive load, including alcohol intoxication, interfering auditory tones, 
instructions against effortful thinking and ego depletion, Van Berkel, et al. (2015) found 
that subjects endorsed hierarchy over egalitarianism when they didn’t have the time or 
cognitive capacity to think about their responses. This effect held true for values 
(participants supported power values over those of benevolence and universalism), 
attitudes (participants more strongly endorsed the authority/hierarchy moral foundation 
from Moral Foundations Theory, Haidt & Joseph, 2004), and behavior (participants 
preferred to allocate more resources to high status groups in a laboratory activity). This 
preference for hierarchy over equality would likely be heightened by higher social class, 
an extension supported by Social Dominance Theory, which posits that preferring 
hierarchy is a personality trait that predicts more negative attitudes towards the poor in 
high-SES groups but not in low-SES groups (Pratto, et al., 2000; Bernardo, 2013).      
Second, possessing high status tends to translate into beliefs about deservingness 
of that status through attribution biases (Major, 1994).  When people enjoy high status, it 
is protective of one’s self-worth to believe one has earned this, rather than attributing 
position to a random and unpredictable system (Pratto & Stewart, 2012). If position is 
random, it can be taken away and doesn’t continue to confer the same advantages. 
Therefore, because people are motivated to believe they (Steele, 1988) and their groups 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986) are inherently good and moral, people who believe they are high 
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status generally turn to dispositional attributions and explanations based in personal merit 
to explain their position in society (Kraus, Piff & Keltner, 2009). In a 2013 study, 
participants’ subjective social class ranks were positively correlated with a belief in an 
existing meritocracy and generalized proportional fairness; higher SES was associated 
with stronger beliefs in ideas that would reinforce their own deservingness (Kraus & 
Keltner, 2013).  Interestingly, these effects were mediated by an increased sense of 
participants’ personal control over their own life choices, suggesting that the cognitive 
effects of long-term high status are based in the realities of the advantages of possessing 
it.  
Third, these beliefs in the meritocracy and general deservingness in the world also 
lead to stronger beliefs in essentialism: the idea that the social categories people belong to 
are fixed, unchangeable, have biological foundations, and can accurately represent their 
members (Mahalingam, 2003). Kraus & Keltner (2013) extended essentialism scales of 
other social categories (i.e. race) to develop a 10-item SES essentialism scale. Items 
included “It is possible to determine one’s social class by examining their genes” and “It 
is easy to figure out another person’s social class just by looking at them.” Correlational 
studies with this scale and measures of subjective and objective social class revealed a 
strong positive association: increased subjective (but not objective) social class was 
associated with increased endorsement of both the discreteness and biological 
foundations of social class categories. In addition, the authors found that beliefs in 
generalized proportional fairness mediated the relationship between subjective social 
class and essentialist beliefs about class categories.  
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Prior research has also sought to extend intergroup theories of race and gender to 
SES. However, although social class may be objectively divided into three to six discrete 
groups (e.g., working poor and upper middle class), and some may believe in the 
essentialism of class, most people are not aware of the details of these distinctions 
(Dugan, 2012). Most importantly, while members of social classes have differing ideas 
about the essentialism of their class, it is less clear whether members have strong 
entitativity with other members, failing to consider the group an interdependent, coherent 
unit (Lickel, 2006). Indeed, the vast majority of Americans believe themselves to be 
middle class, regardless of their actual position in the socioeconomic hierarchy (Dugan, 
2012). Therefore, while realistic group competition theory and group position theory 
might explain how other high status groups are motivated to maintain their position, these 
theories may be less applicable to socioeconomic status. The key characteristic of class, 
then, is that it is rooted in more nuanced and individual social comparison, and one’s 
perception of one’s own social class changes depending on whether the comparison is 
being made to those above or below them.  
One interesting consequence of social comparison being a large component of 
social class is the overwhelming tendency of Americans to deny the current state of 
income inequality. In a 2011 study, Norton & Ariely found that Americans objectively 
preferred an income distribution such as Sweden’s where each quintile earns roughly the 
same percentage of the national income. Then, when asked to estimate the proportion of 
wealth earned by each quintile in the US, Americans vastly underestimated the earnings 
of the upper quintile: respondents estimated that the rich earned 59% of the total income 
of all Americans, while the reality is that they earn 84%, a 25 point difference. Moreover, 
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upper class participants were even less accurate than low SES participants at estimating 
income inequality in the US (Norton & Ariely, 2011). The authors theorize that this 
disconnect between participants’ estimates of inequality and the actual objective reality 
arises not from ignorance but from a sort of cognitive dissonance; enjoying unfair 
advantage over others due to no input on one’s own part works against a need to believe 
that one is good and moral. Indeed, those who feel this existential guilt are more likely to 
accept their wealth was partly earned through birth and fortune. If this cognitive 
dissonance is a primary motivation capable of biasing our understanding of reality, the 
desire to work in opposition to a meritocracy in favor of social justice should be rare.  
Furthermore, wealth, deservingness and essentialism are associated with certain 
political ideologies; specifically, increased wealth and stronger beliefs in meritocracy are 
associated with political conservatism, while the opposite is true of political liberalism. 
However, wealth in itself interacts with political identity to predict support of policies 
that perpetuate inequality. Kraus & Callaghan (2014) conducted a study of members of 
Congress, taking into account their political party, personal wealth, and support for bills 
that reduce inequality. As personal wealth increased, support for bills that reduce 
inequality decreased, even accounting for political party pressure. In particular, the 
authors found that Democrats were less likely to support bills that reduced inequality as 
wealth increased, while Republicans were more consistently unsupportive.  
Combined, these beliefs serve to help maintain status in the social hierarchy, 
which is in the self-interest of both those who have achieved high status and those who 
aim to do so. Believing that one deserves to possess his or her status and that others can 
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work to achieve the same if they were only capable also extends to a link between SES 
and other kinds of moral emotions, attitudes, and behavior. 
Research on SES and emotion has suggested that higher status individuals feel 
and express more positive emotions (Gallo & Mathews, 2003). On the other hand, a few 
studies show that because higher status individuals are less likely to engage with others 
(e.g. showing less attentive behavior, less accurately reading emotions, etc.), higher 
social class also predicts less empathic accuracy and compassion (Stellar, Manzo, Kraus 
& Keltner, 2011). In a set of four studies, the authors showed that higher class individuals 
reported less dispositional compassion across situations, less compassion in reaction to 
others’ suffering, and that this link between SES and compassion was mediated by less of 
a tendency to perceive context and accurately perceive distress in others as social class 
increased. This relative decrease in compassion, combined with social class comparison 
bias, provides two reasons higher social class would predict more tolerance of inequality: 
not only are high status groups less aware of it, they are also less likely to identify the 
distress of low status others and feel compassion towards their plight.  
Beyond emotion, how are moral attitudes and behaviors related to SES? On a 
large scale, nationwide, upper class households donate a smaller proportion of their 
income to charity than do lower class households (Piff, Kraus, Cote, Cheng & Keltner, 
2010). On a smaller scale, several studies have also suggested that higher social class is 
associated with less prosocial behavior including generosity, charitable donations, 
trusting behavior, and helping behavior – all independent of ethnicity, gender, and 
religiosity (Piff, et al., 2010).   
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Similarly, in one set of seven studies on SES and unethical behavior, upper class 
participants were more likely to cut off other drivers or pedestrians while driving, and 
more likely to report that they would engage in activities involving “unrightfully taking 
or benefiting from something” (Piff, Stancato, Cote, Mendoza-Denton, Keltner, 2012). 
They were also more likely to lie in a laboratory interview and cheat at a game of chance. 
These effects were mediated by positive moral attitudes towards greed, and 
experimentally manipulating these attitudes led to unethical behavior across class 
measures.  
  A sample of Dutch nationals with objective measures of SES suggests an 
extension of these findings and points to the content of immorality as a likely mediator of 
the relationship between SES and unethical attitudes and behavior. Specifically, 
Trautmann and colleagues (2013) suggest that high and low social class individuals live 
in different moral matrices where the upper class care more about victimless crimes 
against the community while personally harmful crimes are more tolerable. Relationship 
infidelity, for example, is more acceptable to the upper class, but lying for welfare 
benefits is considered more immoral. The authors suggest that these differences in moral 
attitudes are related to self-interest and opportunity, pointing to a cost/benefit analysis of 
morality; if roles and positions in the social hierarchy were reversed, they believe most 
people wouldn’t hesitate to grasp potentially immoral opportunities to further self-interest 
(Trautmann, van de Kuilen & Zeckhauser, 2013). If other kinds of moral emotions, 
behaviors, and attitudes are largely motivated by self-interest among the high social class, 
low support for social justice and a high tolerance for inequality should follow the same 
pattern of motivation. The research on SES and deservingness, essentialism, and 
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prosociality seems to confirm the extension for those of high social class, but does the 
self-interest motivation hold for those of low social class? 
2. Low Social Class Predicts High Support for Social Justice 
Lower socioeconomic status is generally related to a more accurate understanding 
of the reality of income inequality and more support for liberal policies related to 
economic redistribution (Norton & Ariely, 2001; Brandt, 2013). Thus, in keeping with 
self-interest as a strong motivator, there are parallel explanations for why low 
socioeconomic status should predict low tolerance for economic inequality and high 
support for social justice similar to the self-interest motives of high SES individuals.  
In general, research on low-income individuals and their support of equality and 
redistribution is limited, and any studies that do address this group generally show 
findings that are the opposite of those for high-income individuals. For example, just as 
high SES is associated with stronger beliefs in, and preference for, deservingness, 
meritocracy, hierarchy, and class-based essentialism, low SES is negatively associated 
with all of these (Kraus  & Keltner, 2013; Bernardo, 2013). Several empirical studies also 
demonstrate that low social class predicts a higher dependence on contextual (vs. 
dispositional) explanations of inequality and personal outcomes, and that this association 
is mediated by a diminished sense of personal control (Kraus, et al., 2009). This reliance 
on situational explanations stemming from the apparent lack of choices perceived by 
those living in poverty may be related to the decreased emphasis on meritocracy and 
class-based essentialism.  
Moreover, the studies linking high SES with less prosocial emotions, attitudes, 
and behavior similarly suggest that low SES is associated with higher levels of empathic 
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concern, sympathy, compassion, charitable giving, and helping behavior (Piff, et al., 
2010; Stellar, et al., 2011; Piff, et al., 2012). Low SES is also related to harsher moral 
judgments of harmful transgressions against the group, suggesting an intolerance for 
moral violations in general when under the strain of reduced material resources (Pitesa & 
Thau, 2014). International research also suggests that lower SES is related to a greater 
emphasis on interdependence and relational concerns (Snibbe & Markus, 2005; Hitokoto, 
2014). Thus, a decreased belief in meritocracy and class-based essentialism combined 
with an increased emphasis on prosociality and interdependence would align with the 
assumption that low social class would be associated with greater support for social 
justice. Yet, the self-interest motive does not appear to be embraced by all when it comes 
to the relationship between SES and support of social justice. The following two sections 
address the various possible explanations for why those of high social class might support 
social justice and why those of low social class might not.  
3. High Social Class and High Support for Social Justice 
As discussed, the psychological experience of high social class tends to correlate 
with belief in concepts that would not support social justice. However, surveys such as 
the 2015 Gallup poll consistently identify a substantial minority of high social class 
individuals who apparently do support redistribution and the mitigation of socioeconomic 
inequality. If believing and acting in support of social justice works against self-interest 
for people of high social class, what are possible explanations for this seemingly altruistic 
behavior? Not surprisingly, most of the proposed hypotheses relate to affect, in contrast 
to the cerebral explanations related to self-interest. Increases in income actually predict 
increases in social trust, a key component of support for social justice (Brandt, Wetherell 
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& Henry, 2014). But the strongest explanations for high class predicting high support for 
social justice include guilt, empathy, and anger (moral outrage), in addition to strong 
helping values and the possible cognitive ease of endorsing equality across groups. 
Overall, however, all of these explanations are both supported and negated by different 
studies and the literature as a whole is limited, leaving a gap in the research that may be 
partially filled by the psychological mediator presented at the end of this review.  
First, guilt can be a strong motivator to rectify situations and existential guilt has 
been proposed as an explanation for why high social class might predict less tolerance of 
inequality. Existential guilt is composed of equal parts the perception that one’s 
advantages were not earned and/or deserved, and the perception that one is responsible 
for this inequality because one’s advantages are enjoyed at the expense of the 
disadvantaged (Montada & Schneider, 1989). First proposed in the 70s to explain White 
participation in the Civil Rights movement, existential guilt (along with empathy and 
moral outrage) was explored in a large survey of over 800 German citizens whose 
existential guilt somewhat predicted prosocial commitments (Montada & Schneider, 
1989). However, empathy and moral outrage were shown to be far stronger predictors of 
prosociality and intolerance of inequality, and were also highly correlated with existential 
guilt, suggesting that it may be a secondary or associated emotion but not a primary 
motivation.  
 Second, a large body of research does suggest that empathy is associated with 
more prosocial behavior; consider for example, the “empathy-altruism hypothesis” in 
which empathy predicts helping behavior (Batson, 1991; Eisenberg & Morris, 2001). 
Specifically, empathy has been defined as an affective state associated with an ability to 
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take others’ perspective and feel concerns for others in distress (Decety & Yoder, 2016). 
On the trait level, specific links between empathy and social inequality are even 
suggested in a “social empathy” model in which an empathic disposition allows a person 
to take a group’s perspective and more “deeply understand…structural inequalities” 
(Segal, 2011). However, the antecedents that predict such trait empathy are still less 
understood, especially considering that wealth is negatively correlated with empathy 
(Stellar, et al., 2011).  
Hoffman (1990) puts forth a sequence of theories regarding the emotional 
motivations for group-based prosociality associated with empathic distress over another’s 
plight. He suggests that empathy for another is “cognitively extended” when a person 
imagines such issues as homelessness and hunger, thereby evoking the same feelings 
towards a group that one would experience if they were directly witnessing another’s 
pain. Then, as long as the person feeling empathy believes either they or someone else is 
at fault for this distress, empathy would serve as a “justice motive,” encouraging 
rectifying large social injustices (Hoffman, 1990).  
 However, empathy is a complex emotion in that it also motivates attempts to 
decrease one’s own very real distress – and the cognitively easiest way to do so would be 
to decide the victims themselves are to blame, thereby absolving oneself of any personal 
guilt or anger at a separate perpetrator who could have caused the victim’s distress. 
Indeed in their model of allocation of resources, Skitka & Tetlock (1992) provide 
evidence that, especially under resource scarcity, attributions of the cause of a victim’s 
misfortune are paramount: participants denied aid to those whom they felt were directly 
responsible for their own plight. Furthermore, empathy itself or any measure of 
 24 
 
dispositional empathic concern wouldn’t necessarily predict a preference for fairness or 
social justice. This is because empathy requires a target and this target may vary; 
empathizing with those who supposedly work hard or earn their privilege would predict 
preference for fairness just as much as empathizing with those who may be 
disadvantaged because of their group membership would predict preference for social 
justice. Moreover, contrary to Hoffman’s assertion that sympathy is always associated 
with increased prosociality, Batson (1991) asserts that without emotional self-regulation, 
heightened empathic responses can result in an intense negative affective state that results 
in personal distress and a focus on the self, a state that would not lead to preference for 
group-based egalitarianism. Indeed, a 2008 empirical study shows that manipulating 
empathy increased concern for another subject’s outcomes but did not change the 
individual’s concern for outcomes related to larger egalitarian values (Lange, 2008). 
Essentially, empathy for the specific needy other did not directly translate into concern 
for larger social groups or more abstract societal causes. Furthermore, research on 
allocations of resources showed that both self-interested egoism and inducing empathy 
for a specific other resulted in equally reduced allocations to the larger ingroup, serving 
as equal threats to the common good (Batson, et al., 1999). Last, some studies suggest 
that people are more likely to feel empathy for those most similar to them, suggesting a 
barrier to feeling empathy for those in different social groups (Hoffman, 2000). 
Therefore, the question still exists: what motivates a person who feels empathy for those 
suffering from social injustices to want to rectify the injustices among the group at large 
rather than take any other attitude or action involving self-interest or helping a specific 
needy other? 
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 Perhaps the answer lies with a third option: besides empathy and guilt, anger has 
been shown to be a strong moral emotion with motivating properties. However, research 
on moral outrage is extremely ambiguous: while some research supports moral outrage as 
a unique form of anger at the violation of a moral value, several studies also show that 
what is called “moral outrage” is actually not distinct from anger at personal or close 
others’ distress. Moral outrage, defined as a powerful moral emotion, has been utilized in 
many recent studies and positively associated with prosociality: Van de Vyver and 
Abrams (2015) found that inciting “moral outrage” in relation to a wronged third-party 
other predicted prosocial financial and political behavior, and Tan, Liu, Zheng and Huang 
(2015) found that reduced moral outrage predicted greater intentions of corrupt behavior. 
However, by experimentally manipulating conditions that should differentially produce 
moral outrage and anger at personal disadvantage, O’Mara and colleagues (2011) found 
that subjects only reported anger when they were themselves the victim of unfair 
treatment, but not when a stranger was treated the same way. Uehara, et al. (2014) 
showed that this kind of “moral outrage” was also applicable to close others and people 
with whom a shared identity had been created (i.e. Japanese). Batson and colleagues 
(2007) suggest that the underlying mediator is actually empathy: a similar experimental 
manipulation was effective at provoking anger at unfair treatment as long as empathic 
concern for the stranger had been generated experimentally first, but the concern was 
both temporary and specific to the target needy other.  
 Beyond emotional motivations, one possible explanation for high social class 
individuals’ belief in social justice lies in presuming that group-based equality is 
cognitively easier and less taxing than understanding and perpetuating a hierarchy of any 
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sort. However, several studies refute this claim and in fact demonstrate that endorsing a 
hierarchy is the primary mode of thought, while social justice requires a “cognitive 
override.” Skitka & Tetlock (1993) explored the idea that egalitarianism was a 
“mindless” allocation rule, allowing people to distribute resources without attending to 
need, efficiency, or attributions for cause. However, when participants were 
experimentally manipulated to think deeply about allocating specific resources to a 
detailed list of options, egalitarian allocations remained unchanged. This is supported by 
studies showing that, under several types of cognitive load, people were more likely to 
endorse values, attitudes, and behavior in line with hierarchy over egalitarianism, which 
required more extensive deliberation (Van Berkel, et al., 2015).   
Lastly, it may be true that rather than being driven by existential guilt, empathic 
concern for similar others, or moral outrage at the violation of a moral value, high social 
class individuals who endorse group-based equality are simply altruistic and strongly 
believe in helping values. Although empirical research suggests that higher social class is 
actually associated with less helping behavior (Piff, et al., 2010), one study linking 
helping and status suggests that purposefully choosing to be the target of helping requests 
was an effort to maintain high status in exchange relationships (Flynn, Reagans, 
Amanatullah & Ames, 2006). This particular association may provide an explanation that 
reconciles both the self-interest motivation to maintain status and the emotional 
motivation to help others. In an effort to understand the underpinnings of social justice, I 
analyzed a large-scale survey of over 1,000 Psychology students at a large, liberal 
university in which participants completed several measures including three regarding 
helping values, fairness, and social justice. Helping values included such items as “a 
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decent person will go out of his or her way to help others” rated on a 9-point likert scale. 
An OLS regression showed that Helping was a strong predictor of Social Justice scores 
(β = .51, p < .001) and Fairness scores (β = .52, p < .001). However, importantly, 
Fairness was not a significant predictor of Social Justice scores (β = .05, p = .51). 
Moreover, even combined, these two variables only explained 19% of the variance in 
Social Justice scores, leaving 81% unexplained by helping values. Therefore, even if 
strong helping values are associated with endorsing social justice, it is not the only, nor 
the majority, of the explanation for why high social class might predict greater support of 
social justice.  
In fact, in a conceptual paper describing several motives that drive prosociality on 
a large scale, Batson and Ahmad (2002) argue that altruism, egoism, and collectivism are 
all flawed in that they are often variable and temporary, as emotions tend to be, and only 
emphasize a smaller ingroup worthy of help. The paper then calls for exploration of a 
more inclusive, rational, and consistent moral motivation that might drive broad 
prosociality besides self-interest or empathy-induced altruism. Principlism, the aim to 
uphold any moral principle or value, is proposed as just such a large-scale, rational and 
consistent motivation. Principlism isn’t specific to a certain person, group, or situation, 
and isn’t subject to the transience of emotional motivation. Social justice could very 
likely be one form of principlism. If so, this would fit with the data showing that neither 
self-interest nor helping values make up the majority of social justice beliefs, and 
establishes social justice as an important moral value in need of further investigation. 
Still, the research on empathy and helping values leaves the question of why there are 
people of high social class who support social justice against self-interest largely 
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unanswered. To answer this question, a potential psychological mediator will be 
presented that may help bring disparate studies and explanations together into a more 
cohesive model.  
4. Low Social Class and Low Support for Social Justice 
 First, though, the explanations for why people of low social class might not 
support social justice must be addressed. If self-interest is assumed to be a primary 
motivation, low social class would predict a higher intolerance of socioeconomic 
inequality and an active belief in social justice as these attitudes would move towards 
advantaging the self and the ingroup. However, studies show that this association is not 
as strong as would be predicted, so proposed explanations for this lie in negative 
emotions and stress, the cognitive simplicity of hierarchy, and System Justification 
Theory.   
First, a review of the relationship between socioeconomic status and health 
outcomes suggests that negative emotions mediate this association; specifically, lower 
class individuals are far more likely to report higher levels of depression, anxiety, anger, 
hostility, and hopelessness (Gallo & Matthews, 2003). These concepts have been 
integrated in the reserve capacity model in which low SES predicts decreased stress-
management resources through psychosocial pathways, resulting in “enhanced emotional 
and physiological reactivity to stress” (Gallo, 2009). The associations between low SES 
and negative affect are also embodied in behavioral outcomes such as increased 
interpersonal conflict and work strain (Matthews, et al., 2000). How are increased stress 
and negative affect relevant to beliefs about inequality? Stress and negative emotions are 
known to narrow perspective in many ways, including promotion of local (rather than 
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global) processing and focus on concrete (rather than abstract) construal level 
(Derryberry & Reed, 1998; Watkins, Moberly & Moulds, 2008). Stress and negative 
emotions acting as cognitive load can also predict more utilitarian moral decision-making 
in line with the cognitive ease of preference for hierarchy (Starcke, Polzer, Wolfe & 
Brand, 2010; Van Berkel, et al., 2010). Thus, the reality of the strain of low SES might 
induce a more restricted world view in which the cognitively easiest path of tolerance of 
inequality is chosen for the sake of simplicity.  
The systematic extension of this idea is presented as a coherent model in over 
twenty years of research both supporting and critiquing System Justification Theory: 
“… system justification theory proposes that people actively defend and bolster 
existing social arrangements, often by denying or rationalizing injustices and 
other problems, even when doing so comes at the expense of their personal and 
group interests” (Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004).  
Explanations for why people engage in system justification include the previously 
proposed cognitive ease of hierarchy, need for structure and closure, as well as emotional 
stability from justifying the status quo (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon & Sullivan, 2003). 
Essentially, justifying the system and its outcomes may be one resolution to the cognitive 
dissonance that arises from recognizing that the system disadvantages specific groups and 
not actively fighting against it (actions costing considerable momentous effort), which 
translates into passively supporting it. The consequences of system justification for 
income inequality are harmful in that they predict less support for social change and 
redistribution of resources, presumably by reducing “moral outrage” (Jost & Hunyady, 
2005).  
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Empirical support for system justification in women and racial minorities is 
specific to those categories, suggesting that the ideological motivation to justify the 
existing system results in an internalization of inferiority, particularly on an implicit 
level. However, System Justification Theory is especially complex in the context of 
socioeconomic status because, unlike race or gender, individuals can and do sometimes 
experience mobility between categories and, indeed, aspiring to do so is an accepted 
attitude. Group dynamics research suggests that system justification is particularly high 
when ingroup ambivalence and outgroup favoritism are high, which is often the case with 
low SES individuals (Jost & Burgess, 2000). Support for economic system justification 
also lies in the stereotypes people hold about social class as social groups. Kay & Jost 
(2003) found that activating a combination of stereotypes of “poor but happy,” “rich but 
unhappy,” “poor but honest,” and “rich but dishonest” differentially increased support for 
system justification.   
However, research on system justification theory as it relates to socioeconomic 
status, income inequality, or redistribution of resources is not as rigorous as the focus on 
race or gender. There are few studies that specifically refer to economic inequality, and 
those that do often make use of one or two limited measures. For example, in a 2003 
survey of over 1,000 Latino-Americans in the Chicago area, participants responded to 
questions about income, education, occupation, and a single item on income inequality 
asking to what extent differences in pay are required as incentive for people to work hard 
(Jost, et al., 2003). Although this statement was endorsed more by low-income Latinos 
than high-income Latinos, the statement itself hardly represents the concept of social 
justice in its entirety. Similarly, a survey of over 1,000 African-Americans suggested that 
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low SES more strongly predicted agreement with the single statement that “large 
differences in income are necessary for America’s prosperity” (Jost, et al., 2003). 
Although this was assumed evidence for legitimization of income inequality and reduced 
support for equal wealth distribution, the single item doesn’t represent these concepts 
either accurately or completely. In fact, even an accepted measure of economic system 
justification used by Jost & Thompson (2000) uses items on what can be defined as 
fairness (reverse-scored), social justice, and social class essentialism – three concepts that 
are qualitatively different and not necessarily correlated or orthogonal.  
The relative strength of system justification in high versus low SES groups 
remains under debate. While Jost and colleagues maintain that system justification is 
often higher among low SES individuals, Brandt (2013) presents data suggesting that, in 
fact, status-legitimizing beliefs are not different depending on income, education, 
occupation, or national inequality measures. However, similar to most research on SES 
and SJT, Brandt only takes into account the effects of SES on legitimization of the 
political system and trust in government, rather than economic systems and outcomes.   
 Nevertheless, in an attempt to test system justification in populations experiencing 
severe global disadvantage and inequality, Henry & Saul (2006) conducted a large-scale 
survey of over 400 adolescents from the poorest urban and rural areas of Bolivia, a 
severely underdeveloped nation. Although the results were published as confirmatory of 
system justification, the population’s characteristics and the measured variables again did 
not align: while the distinctive characteristic of these subjects was their socioeconomic 
disadvantage, the questions they were asked focused on the political power of the 
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government rather than a far more relevant system of economic inequality. Therefore, the 
question of how system justification is related to social justice is left largely unanswered.  
The relationship between fairness and system justification might have more 
research support. Several empirical studies demonstrate that system justifying beliefs 
motivate meritocratic beliefs, suggesting that fairness principles might be preferred over 
social justice in low-SES groups (Ledgerwood, Mandisodza, Jost & Pohl, 2011). In a 
study of Swiss adolescents, beliefs in school meritocracy were found to be positively 
related to system justification in students from low SES families, but not high 
(Wiederkher, Bonnot, Krauth-Gruber & Darnon,2015). However, even if meritocracy 
beliefs and consequent system justification beliefs allow low-SES groups to believe that 
movement up the socioeconomic hierarchy is possible, research on social mobility (as 
discussed earlier) suggests that the reality is contradictory. Perhaps system justification 
measures reflect opinions about the overall proportional equity of the economic system as 
it is, and fairness as a moral value measures how it should be.  
System justification theory, then, is the primary existing explanation for why 
people of low social class might reject social justice and, passively or not, support 
inequality. However, the research on SJT and socioeconomic status appears to use 
measures that are either single items or inappropriately focused on other aspects of the 
system.  
In sum, if self-interest is considered a primary motive, several empirical studies 
support the idea that higher SES would predict less support of social justice through 
beliefs in deservingness and essentialism, while lower SES would predict greater support 
of social justice. However, since people at all levels of the socioeconomic hierarchy seem 
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to support and oppose redistribution of resources for group-based equality, the question 
remains as to why all people of high social class don’t reject social justice or why all 
people of low social class don’t support it. Explanations for how high SES might still 
predict support for social justice are not adequate; moral outrage may not be different 
from personal distress, and empathy and helping are not the major components of social 
justice. Moreover, empathy for specific needy others has not been shown to be able to be 
extrapolated to large groups or causes in society, making increased contact between high 
and low social class groups an unlikely explanation as well. In addition, relying on 
emotional motivations for benefiting the common good has not proven effective due to 
their inconstancy and tendency to be focused on the ingroup (Batson, et al, 1999). The 
connection between low SES and reduced support for social justice through system 
justification is similarly tenuous: measures of independent and dependent variables in the 
studies examined are insufficient and do not align with the conclusions drawn. 
Furthermore, the literature does not provide a single, overarching concept to explain the 
mixed social justice attitudes of both the high- and low-income groups.  
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CHAPTER 2  
INDIVIDUATED/CATEGORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
A. Literature Review 
Although the question is undoubtedly complex, one social psychological concept 
may provide a part of the cognitive basis for understanding why social class is not simply 
and directly related to attitudes towards socioeconomic inequality. This concept is the 
extent to which one views the self and others as individuated entities with unique abilities 
or as similar members of groups who belong to social categories. Perceiving the self and 
others as individuated entities would lend itself to supporting a number of other beliefs 
antithetical to social justice: system justification, the protestant work ethic, a meritocracy, 
more unethical behavior, less compassion for others, and a general unwillingness to work 
for the common good, especially against self-interest. After all, if one is individuated, the 
community or the social category is less of a relevant concept to the self and identity. 
Most importantly, the individual can work within the system to succeed, reliant on only 
one’s own strengths and abilities to move up the ladder of social class – a belief 
supporting individual deservingness and proportional fairness over social justice. On the 
other hand, perceiving the self and others as group members who belong to social 
categories would be far more conducive to the support of social justice, as well as 
associated prosocial attitudes and behaviors including compassion, helping values, and 
ethical behavior. If one’s success is tied to the relative success of others, the community, 
or the social category, then a system that engenders inequality between us cannot be 
either correct or acceptable, thus increasing support of social justice.  
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The most relevant support for the distinction comes from Wenzel (2004) in which 
participants were more likely to favor equality in resource allocations for themselves and 
others when conditions made a primary self-relevant social category salient, thereby 
deindividuating potential recipients and emphasizing social categories. Compared to 
other conceptualizations of equality, this research comes closest to social justice in that 
prosociality and equality are achieved by not just benefiting those who have less, but 
doing so by taking from those who have more.  
One hypothesized extension of these results to people and social categories would 
be that interdependence and social justice require similar conceptual perspectives, 
thinking about the larger context and similarities with others. Several studies have used 
different measures of self construals to grasp how people are thinking about individual 
deservingness and group membership-based equality. In an exploratory 2007 study on 
self-construal styles, results showed that manipulating an interdependent self-construal 
induced stronger reactions to injustice and moral concerns (Gollwitzer, M., & Bucklein, 
K., 2007).   
Connecting self-construal and micro/macrojustice, Zdaniuk and Bobocel (2011) 
assessed participants’ independent self-construals and found that high scores were 
associated with lower endorsement of macrojustice and lower support for Affirmative 
Action. We interpret Affirmative Action as a prime example of when the values of 
fairness and social justice come into conflict. On the one hand, colleges aim to recruit 
students who display exceptional academic merit. However, admissions policies also take 
into account other considerations such as past hardship, extraneous circumstances, and, 
most importantly, group membership. Making admissions decisions on individual 
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deservingness and merit alone would result in a negatively skewed distribution of 
admissions concentrated in groups with access to more resources. Thus interpreted from 
our perspective, Zdaniuk and Bobocel (2011) found that people who defined themselves 
in terms of their independence from others were less likely to use what we would 
consider a social justice lens and instead relied on a fairness lens when considering 
Affirmative Action.   
However, the distinction between individuated or categorical thinking is probably 
not limited to perceptions of people; it is more likely the case that these distinctions apply 
on a deeper, cognitive level and encompass a way of thinking in general.   
Thus, even on a cognitive level, research conducted in the field of construal level 
theory supports the distinction made here. Construal level theory maintains that objects, 
events, individuals and other concepts can all be mentally represented at either higher or 
lower levels.  Higher level construals are associated with abstract thinking, greater mental 
distance, and overarching categorizations that see similarities and correspond to the 
purpose of the representation; lower level construals are associated with concrete 
thinking, specific details and differences, less structure, and correspond to the context of 
a representation (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Several studies suggest that higher construal 
levels and abstract mindsets are associated with greater social distance and a preference 
for moral principles over situation-specific considerations (Stephen, Liberman & Trope, 
2011; Eyal, Liberman & Trope, 2008). Furthermore, a higher level construal is associated 
with greater group identification and seeing similarities between people (McCrea, Wieber 
& Myers, 2012). Lastly, in judging moral dilemmas, an abstract/higher level perspective 
taken by creating social distance appears to focus attention away from individuating 
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information and specific contextual details towards categories and abstract moral 
principles.  
The individuated -categorical distinction may look similar to other distinctions 
made in the field in relation to other domains. However, the distinction most likely 
transcends cross-cultural understandings of individualism versus collectivism. Although 
it may align with definitions of a collectivist culture, the distinction is probably most 
useful if considered valid within cultures, existing even in Western cultures prone to 
individualism. For example, a study of individualism and collectivism in Italy 
demonstrated that great variance exists within Italians, and that social class and other 
circumstances only partially explained the variance (Knight & Nisbett, 2007). The 
distinction, first established by Markus & Kitayama (1991) as independent and 
interdependent self-construals, is extended here because it refers to a perspective that 
applies to situations and thinking in a general sense.  
One other distinction in the social class literature that aligns with this is the 
solipsism-contextualism spectrum proposed by Kraus, et al. (2012): 
“…social class contexts elicit reliable social cognitive patterns among lower-class 
individuals—characterized by a contextual, externally-oriented cognitive and 
relational orientation to the world—and upper-class individuals—characterized by 
a solipsistic, individualistic cognitive and relational orientation to the world.” 
(Kraus, et al., 2012) 
The authors propose, however, that contextualism and/or solipsism arise from the 
realities of social class and provide several testable hypotheses based on expecting 
behaviors and attitudes aligned with what appears to be self-interest within a social class. 
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For example, lower class should be (and is) associated with increased empathy, increased 
importance of relationships, and situational attributions (Kraus, et al., 2012). However, 
no hypotheses about the effects of contextualism/solipsism on beliefs about inequality 
and social justice are proposed. Furthermore, the individuated-categorical distinction is 
not confined to a specific social class, like solipsism/contextualism, and, thus, is able to 
answer questions about why people hold other attitudes that do not align with self-interest 
according to social class, as well. For example, the individuated-categorical distinction 
could explain the findings of a 2014 qualitative study of working-class women, which 
suggested that a lack of material resources often predicted social isolation rather than the 
connections and interdependence predicted by so many (Stephens, Cameron & 
Townsend, 2014). 
B. My Prior Research 
  In my own research, several studies support the idea that a perspective focused 
on individuated information versus categorical similarities might provide a framework 
with which to understand the mixed associations between social class and beliefs about 
inequality. 
Following the thread of individuated vs. categorical perceptions of others, a 
preliminary set of studies attempted to examine the relationships between social justice, 
fairness, and several existing and possibly relevant distinctions. Social Justice was 
generally positively correlated with such concepts as an Interdependent Self-Construal (r 
= .17, p < .05, n = 300; Singelis, 1994), Collectivism (r = .30, p < .05, n = 198; Triandis 
& Gelfland, 1994), and Collective Self-Esteem (r = .12, p < .05, n = 301; Luhtanen & 
Crocker, 1992). Similarly, Fairness was positively correlated with such concepts as 
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Independent Self-Construal (r = .14, p < .05, n = 300; Singelis, 1994). Neither Social 
Justice nor Fairness was correlated with Social & Personal Identity, (r = .10, p > .05, r = -
.05, p > .05, n = 197; Nario-Redmond, Biernat, Eidelman & Palenske, 2004). However, 
no one concept accounted for more than 12% of the variance in Social Justice or Fairness 
scores, leaving over 88% of the variance unexplained by existing concepts.  
A second avenue of study attempted to manipulate individuated and group-based 
thinking by asking subjects to consider either their similarities with or differences from 
close others. Perhaps by activating thoughts about others in general, both primes 
marginally increased participants’ sensitivity to implicit social justice violations in real-
world scenarios compared to a no-prime condition. Next, a third study asked participants 
to report identification with a personal strength (individual), a general group, or a specific 
social category. Results involved a prime-by-individual difference interaction whereby 
participants who were already high on social justice showed increased sensitivity to it 
when primed with a social category, but not with a personal strength or general group. 
Participants who were low on social justice were not significantly sensitive to any of the 
primes. Although these studies suggest some support for the individuated-categorical 
distinction, the manipulations and dependent measures require further revision to be 
conclusive.  
To extend the distinction to cognition, social justice was hypothesized to involve 
a style of processing that promotes thinking about the “big picture.” Because Fairness is 
believed to involve a restricted perspective of specific units of exchange, it was predicted 
that this would be connected to a concrete cognitive framework focused on details, rather 
than the big picture. Conversely, because Social Justice involves an inclusive, horizontal 
 40 
 
comparison across groups, it was predicted that this broader perspective would be 
connected to an abstract cognitive framework. One preliminary study thus asked 322 
online respondents to complete a Construal Level priming task drawn from Fujita, Trope, 
Liberman, & Levin-Sagi (2006). In this task, the instructions to the participant determine 
whether the task primed a concrete construal or an abstract construal level. The “abstract” 
directions are to list the larger categories that define each of 20 distinct items. The 
“concrete” directions are to list specific examples of the same 20 items. The control 
condition did not involve any priming task. Participants also either completed the 
Fairness scale or Social Justice scale utilized earlier. Participants (n = 436) were 
randomly assigned to one of six conditions crossing abstract, concrete, and no-prime 
construals with completion of the Fairness and Social Justice scales.  
Fairness scale scores did not differ across the three priming conditions (i.e., 
abstract, concrete, and no-prime control; Ms = 5.59, 5.65, and 5.81 respectively), 
F(2,223) = 1.26, p = .286.  However, there was a significant difference in Social Justice 
scores by prime, F(2,207) = 3.799, p = .024.  Post hoc analyses (p < .05) revealed that 
there were no differences between the concrete and control conditions (Ms = 5.20 and 
5.17, respectively), but both differed significantly from the abstract prime condition (M = 
5.67).  Inducing an abstract state of mind resulted in higher endorsement of Social 
Justice, compared with both concrete and no prime conditions, suggesting that Social 
Justice likely involves a style of processing that promotes thinking about categorical 
similarities.  
In summary, while the relationship between social class and beliefs about 
inequality would be expected to be simple and direct following the aims of self-interest, 
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national polls and other research suggest that this is not the case. In both high and low 
social class groups, a substantial minority of respondents have attitudes towards 
socioeconomic inequality and redistribution that are not systematically advantageous to 
them.  Encompassing these attitudes about inequality and redistribution as “social justice” 
– as well as a belief in proportionality and meritocracy as “fairness” – and manipulating 
the psychological experience of social class through relative comparison in empirical 
studies may be able to shed light on the source of the variance in the relationship between 
social class and social justice. Specifically, a cognitive perspective using individuated or 
categorical thinking may be the explanation for the discrepancy: perhaps thinking in 
terms of abstract and categorical (rather than concrete and individuated) information is 
what allows for the support for social justice across social classes.  
Studies on multitasking, available cognitive capacity, and construal level suggest 
that abstract thinking is more effortful and difficult to engage in over concrete thinking 
(Kazakova, Cauberghe, Pandelaere, & De Pelsmacker, 2015). If engaging in abstract 
thinking is more difficult, this can explain why some may not generally endorse the 
principles of social justice - across social classes. This may also explain why some people 
of low social class are less supportive of social justice considering the general stress 
involved in the realities of low SES and the resulting relative reduction in available 
processing capacity. Similarly, it may also explain why some people of high social class 
are more supportive of social justice lacking as they are in those socioeconomic strains.  
The following studies aimed to understand the particular relationship between 
social class, beliefs in social justice and fairness, and individuated versus categorical 
thinking. Specifically, the following four studies attempted to investigate if this 
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individuated versus categorical perspective can contribute to understanding the complex 
relationship between social class and social justice.  
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CHAPTER 3 
STUDIES 1 & 2 
A. STUDY 1 
1. Purpose 
As a step towards systematically exploring the relationship between social class 
and beliefs about inequality, the first two studies manipulated high and low social class 
between subjects and measured the effects on support for Social Justice and Fairness. 
Although national polls and correlational studies suggest generally mixed outcomes, no 
empirical research has established the relationship explicitly. Manipulating social class 
within the studies was intended to help establish its effects with more clarity – and help 
quantify the amount of variability that will certainly exist. Second, Studies 1 and 2 also 
aimed to examine how the individuated/categorical cognitive perspective is related to 
social class and beliefs about social justice. Therefore, the extent to which participants 
are thinking with an individuated or categorical perspective was also measured using two 
eight-item measures.  Studies 1 and 2 were identical except for the dependent measures 
used: Study 1 utilized two five-item scales to measure support for Fairness and Social 
Justice while Study 2 used ratings of ten scenarios presenting the two in conflict.  
The hypothesized outcomes for Study 1 were that participants in the high social 
class condition will report lower scores on the Social Justice scale (but not Fairness) 
compared to participants in the control and low social class conditions, and participants in 
the low social class condition will report higher scores on the Social Justice scale (but not 
Fairness). Moreover, a majority of the variance in both dependent measures will be 
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unexplained by the manipulation, but responses will be strongly predicted by 
participants’ individuated/categorical perspective.  
2. Methods 
a.  Participants 
Participants were recruited online through Amazon Mechanical Turk from a 
diverse and inclusive population in January of 2017. Although 309 participants began the 
study, seven participants were excluded for incomplete responses, or if the time they took 
to complete the study was more than three standard deviations above the mean 
completion time (M = 5.8 minutes). Ultimately, 302 participants were randomly assigned 
to one of three conditions. Participants provided informed consent and received monetary 
compensation for their participation of $0.35, which reflects norms on the MTurk 
platform.  
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 77 (M = 36.1 years, SD = 13.04). Fifty-nine 
percent of the participants were female. The majority of participants described 
themselves as White (76.5%), 7.9% Black, 5.3% Hispanic/Latino/a, 6% Asian/Pacific 
Islander, and 2.6% multiethnic.  
All participants were located in the U.S. while participating in the study, and 
95.7% were born in the U.S. (12 participants were born outside of the US). In terms of 
current location, 52% of participants were reporting from states that voted for a 
conservative presidential candidate in the majority of the last eight elections (“red” 
states); forty-eight percent of participants were located in states that voted for a liberal 
presidential candidate in the majority of the last eight elections (“blue” states).  
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In terms of education, 20% of participants reported having a high school degree or GED, 
31% associate’s degree or some college, 32% bachelor’s degree, 15% master’s, and 2.6% 
reported having completed advanced graduate work. Participants also reported household 
income ranges: median reported household income range was $40,000 - $49,999, slightly 
lower than the national median ($50,000 - $59,999, Census 2015).  
b.  Materials 
1) Social Class Manipulation 
Both of the first two studies operationalized the independent variable as a priming 
task using a rank ladder manipulation. In this task, participants were randomly assigned 
to one of three conditions: high social class, low social class, and a control condition. 
Participants in all conditions were presented with an image of a ladder with ten rungs and 
a description of the McArthur scale of subjective SES (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo & 
Ickovics, 2000). Participants were instructed to consider the ladder a representation of 
“where people stand in the United States” such that the top of the ladder represents those 
who are best off – with the most money, education, respected jobs, and access to 
resources – and the bottom of the ladder represents those who are worst off [see 
Appendix C for full manipulation and instructions]. Similar to the manipulation 
instructions in Kraus et al. (2010), participants in the high social class condition were 
asked to write about a hypothetical interaction with someone at the bottom of the ladder 
and participants in the low social class condition were asked to write about a hypothetical 
interaction with someone at the top of the ladder. This manipulation has been used 
successfully to manipulate the comparative nature of social class in relation to others in 
past social psychological research by providing a strong subjective sense of 
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socioeconomic status (see Piff, et al., 2010). As a manipulation check, participants were 
later asked to indicate which of the ten rungs of the ladder best represented their own 
position in the United States. Participants in the control condition did not write about an 
interaction, but they did see the ladder’s description and indicate their perceived position.  
2) Social Justice Scale 
This five-item measure of social justice (α = .87) included such items as “It is 
important for those who are better off to help provide resources for the most vulnerable 
members of society” and “Increased economic equality is ultimately beneficial to 
everyone in society.” All responses were recorded on a seven-point Likert scale with 
anchors at “1” as “strongly disagree” and “7” as “strongly agree.” All participants in all 
conditions responded to a randomized mix of these items and the items from the Fairness 
scale.  
3) Fairness Scale 
This five-item measure (α = .81) was adapted from the Preference for Merit 
Principle scale (Davey, Bobocel, Hing, Zanna, 1999) and included such items as “In 
society, people who do a good job ought to rise to the top” and “The effort a person puts 
into something ought to be reflected in the size of the reward he or she receives.” All 
responses were recorded on a 7-point Likert scale with anchors at “1” as “strongly 
disagree” and “7” as “strongly agree.”  All participants in all conditions responded to a 
randomized mix of these items and the items from the Social Justice scale. 
4) Measures of Individuated/Categorical Thinking 
 Measuring an individuated or categorical cognitive perspective was accomplished 
using two short measures: the Kimchi-Palmer figures task and the Behavior Identification 
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Form (Kimchi & Palmer, 1982; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). For the Kimchi-Palmer 
figure task, eight test items asked participants to view a target figure and then choose the 
most similar figure from two comparison figures (α = .96). The figures are composed of 
three to four small triangles and squares that are similar to the standard figure either in 
individual components or overall structural shape corresponding to local and global 
processing [see Appendix E for full task]. The Behavior Identification Form (BIF) 
included eight items in which a standard task was described in two ways: a higher-level 
purpose-related phrase or a lower-level process-related phrase [see Appendix F for full 
task]. Participants chose the phrase that best describes the standard task for them (α = 
.62). For both measures, the average of higher-level figures or tasks chosen out of eight 
items was calculated and served as two measures of individuated versus categorical 
thinking.  
c.  Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: a control condition (n 
= 132), a high social class condition (n = 88), and a low social class condition (n = 82). 
Participants first completed the rank ladder manipulation task for either high or low 
social class (the control condition did not complete any task but did see the description of 
the ladder) and then indicated their position on the ladder. Participants in all three 
conditions then completed the five items from the Social Justice scale and the five items 
from the Fairness scale in random order. An image of the SSS ladder remained on screen 
to strengthen the manipulation for the experimental conditions. Then, all participants 
completed the Kimchi-Palmer figure task and the BIF items. The two measures were 
presented in four blocks in which items were randomized: four Kimchi-Palmer figures, 
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four BIF items, the four remaining Kimchi-Palmer figures, and then the four remaining 
BIF items. Last, participants provided demographic information including age, race, 
gender, political identity, religiosity, income, occupation, and educational attainment 
level [see Appendix G for full demographic survey].   
3. Results 
a. Analytic Plan 
First, to examine the effects of the social class manipulation on SSS position, and 
social justice and fairness beliefs, a one-way analysis of variance was used to compare 
means across participants in the three conditions. In the absence of a successful 
manipulation, self-ratings of SSS position were used as a continuous measure in analyses 
examining its association with social justice and fairness beliefs. Second, multiple 
regression analyses examined the ability of average scores on the Kimchi-Palmer figures 
task and the Behavioral Identification Form, along with SSS position, to predict social 
justice and fairness beliefs. Third, post-hoc analyses included demographic variables, 
especially political identity, as covariates in an attempt to explore the effect of related 
(and possibly confounding) variables.  
b. Primary Analyses 
Means and standard deviations for positions on the Subjective Social Status (SSS) 
ladder and average scores on the Fairness and Social Justice scales are presented in Table 
1. Overall, participants reported SSS positions close to the midpoint (M = 4.83, SD = 
1.8), and support of Fairness (M = 5.47, SD = 1.02) was slightly higher than support of 
Social Justice (M = 5.14, SD = 1.33), which had slightly greater variance. The 
assumption of normality was tested using the Shapiro-Wilke statistic, which was 
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significant for both Fairness and Social Justice scores (Fairness S-W statistic = .962, df = 
302, p < .001; Social Justice S-W statistic = .955, df = 302, p < .001). Although 
histograms and skewness statistics suggested negatively skewed data (Fairness skewness 
statistic = -.62, SE = .14; Social Justice skewness statistic = -.60, SE = .14), square 
transformations did not restore normality. Furthermore, several responses were extreme 
but could not be considered outliers and, with no statistical or practical motivation to do 
otherwise, were not removed from the sample. Therefore, where appropriate, some non-
parametric tests are reported as well.  
First, to test the effectiveness of the social class manipulation, a one-way analysis 
of variance compared participants assigned to the three conditions (control = 0, high 
social class manipulation = 1, and low social class manipulation = 2) to the measure of 
relative social class (MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status, SSS) asking 
participants to place themselves on a social class ladder with ten rungs from lowest to 
highest. The results of this analysis were found to be statistically non-significant 
(F(2,299) =.749, p = .47) indicating that the social class manipulation task was 
unsuccessful at influencing participants’ report of their relative social class. In addition, a 
similar ANOVA was used to analyze the effect of condition on Fairness and Social 
Justice scale scores; the results of this analysis were also statistically non-significant for 
both scales (Fairness F(2, 299) =.501, p = .74; Social Justice F(2, 299) =.501, p = .74)). 
See Tables 2 and 3 for detailed ANOVA results and means by condition. In addition, 
although the conditions differed in sample size, Levene's test indicated no violation of 
homogeneity of variance (SSS: F = .81, p = .45; Fairness F = 1.56, p = .21, Social Justice 
F = 1.38, p = .25).  
 50 
 
As the dependent variables violated assumptions of normality, a Kruskal-Wallis H 
test was also conducted, which also showed that there were no statistically significant 
differences in Fairness or Social Justice scores between the different conditions, Fairness 
χ2(2) = .882, p = .64; Social Justice χ2(2) = .284, p = .87.  
Thus, as the relative social class manipulation in each condition was unsuccessful 
at manipulating either SSS position or the scale items, further analyses used participants' 
reports of their SSS position on the ladder as a continuous measure of perceived relative 
social class. 
A Pearson product-moment correlation explored the relationship between the ten-
rung SSS ladder (M = 4.83, SD = 1.80), average scores on the five-item Fairness scale 
(M = 5.47, SD = 1.02) and average scores on the five-item Social Justice scale (M = 5.14, 
SD = 1.33). This analysis was found to be statistically significant for SSS and Social 
Justice scores, r(302) = -.22, p < .001, indicating a moderate negative relationship. On the 
other hand, SSS was unrelated to Fairness scores (r(302) = -.03, p = .64). Neither scores 
on the eight-item Kimchi-Palmer Figures nor the eight-item Behavior Identification Form 
were associated with scores on the Social Justice scale, Fairness scale, or the relative 
social class measure. See Table 4 for full correlation table. A Spearman's rank-order 
correlation was also run with similar results (SSS & Social Justice rs(302) = -.24, p < 
.001; SSS and Fairness rs(302) = -.05, p = .38).   
Next, two sets of hierarchical multiple regressions were used to examine the 
efficacy of predicting Fairness scores with position on the SSS ladder and either scores 
on the Kimchi-Palmer figure task or the Behavioral Identification Form (BIF). The 
interaction between SSS and the cognitive measures was entered as a predictor in the 
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second step, allowing the first step to remain a test of the hypothesized main effects. 
However, neither of these regression equations were found to be significant (Kimchi-
Palmer F(3, 298) =.419, p = .74; BIF F(3, 298) = 1.226, p = .30) indicating that relative 
social class, the cognitive measures, and their interaction were not significant predictors 
of responses to the Fairness scale. See Tables 5 and 6 for regression tables.  
Two similar sets of hierarchical multiple regressions were used to examine the 
efficacy of predicting Social Justice scores with positions on the SSS ladder and either 
scores on the Kimchi-Palmer figure task or the Behavioral Identification Form (BIF). The 
interaction between SSS and the cognitive measures was entered as a predictor in the 
second step allowing the first step to remain a test of the main effects.  
In the first analysis, it was found that SSS significantly predicted Social Justice (β 
= -.16, p = .008), but the Kimchi-Palmer Figures did not (β = -.04, p = .94) and the 
interaction was not significant (β = -.02, p = .86).  The results of the regression suggested 
a small effect: the full model explained only 5% of the variance (R
2
adjusted =.04, F(3,298) 
= 5.28, p = .001). Similarly, in the second analysis, it was found that SSS significantly 
predicted Social Justice (β = -.162, p < .001), but the BIF did not (β = .128, p = .68) and 
the interaction was not significant (β = -.096, p = .56).  Moreover, the two predictors 
again independently explained only about 5% of the variance (R
2
adjusted = .04, F(3,298) = 
5.28, p = .001). See Tables 7 and 8 for regression tables. Plots of the residuals for both 
dependent variables appeared normally distributed so the results of these regressions 
indicated that relative social class predicted some variance in stated Social Justice beliefs, 
but the cognitive measures were not significant predictors.  
c. Post-hoc Analyses  
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Next, several demographic variables were explored as covariates in relation to the 
Fairness and Social Justice scales. Fairness was positively associated with political 
identity, r(302) = .20, p < .001. This variable was a composite measure averaging 
responses to two items related to the extent to which participants’ identified with the 
labels “liberal/conservative” and “Democrat/Republican” on a scale from 1 = “Not at all” 
to 7 = “Very.”  Conversely, political identity was negatively associated with Social 
Justice beliefs, r(302) = -.48, p < .001. Social Justice was also negatively associated with 
objective household income range, r(302) = -.15, p = .009. Relative social class (SSS) 
was positively associated with age (r(301) = .12, p = .04), income (r(302) = .53, p < 
.001), conservative political identity (r(302) = .17, p = .004), and education (F(7,294) = 
7.46, p < .001) across 8 increasingly greater education levels. No significant differences 
in the dependent variables were seen across gender, ethnicity, or state political identity 
(i.e. "red" state or "blue" state based on how the state had voted in the majority of the last 
eight presidential elections). In sum, of the seven demographic variables explored, three 
(political identity, household income range, and education) seemed most relevant and 
influential to the dependent variables of relative social class, Fairness, and Social Justice. 
See Table 4 for full correlations table.  
Accordingly, first, the relationship between SSS position and social justice beliefs 
was subjected to a first-order partial correlation in order to explore the relationship 
controlling for the effects of education, income, and political identity. The first-order 
correlation was found to be statistically significant, r(297) = -.12, p = .045, indicating that 
a relationship between the two is slightly weakened but exists above and beyond the 
effects of education, income, and political identity. See Table 9 for correlations table.  
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Second, because Political Identity had the strongest pattern of association with all 
three variables, a one-way analysis of covariance compared participants assigned to the 
three conditions to the measure of relative social class, controlling for the covariate 
effects of political identity. This analysis was also found to be statistically non-significant 
(F(2,296) =.528, p = .59) indicating that the social class manipulation task was 
unsuccessful at influencing participants’ report of their relative social class even after 
controlling for the influence of political identity. Furthermore, a similar one-way analysis 
of covariance also indicated that neither Fairness scores nor Social Justice scores varied 
across conditions after controlling for political identity, (Fairness F(2, 294) = 1.51, p = 
.22; Social Justice F(2, 294) = .965, p = .38).   
Third, hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used to test if SSS position, 
political identity, and the interaction between the two could significantly predict 
participants' endorsement of Social Justice.  It was found that SSS significantly predicted 
Social Justice (β = -.12, p = .002), as did political identity (β = -.34, p < .001) but the 
interaction was not significant (β = .017, p = .41), see Table 10 for details.  The results of 
the regression also indicated that the model explained a moderate 25.5% of the variance 
(R
2
adjusted =.247, F(3,297) = 33.89, p <. 001). 
As political identity and SSS were positively correlated (r(302) = .17, p = .004), a 
mediation model was explored to attempt to represent a more accurate picture of how the 
two variables were related to Social Justice. Results of the analysis showed that the 
relationship between relative social class and social justice beliefs was only partially 
mediated by political identity. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the standardized regression 
coefficient between relative social class and political identity was statistically significant 
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(β = .16), as was the standardized regression coefficient between political identity and 
social justice beliefs (β = -.35). The standardized indirect effect was -.08, CI [-.13, -.03]. 
The significance of this indirect effect was tested using bootstrapping procedures. 
Unstandardized indirect effects were computed for each of 10,000 bootstrapped samples, 
and the 95% confidence interval was computed by determining the indirect effects at the 
2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect was -.06, 
and the 95% confidence interval ranged from -.10 to -.02. However, political identity as 
the mediator could only account for about a third of the total effect, PM = .34.  
Last, hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used to test if SSS position, 
political identity, and the interaction between the two could significantly predict 
participants' endorsement of Fairness.  It was found that only (increasingly conservative) 
political identity was a significant predictor (β = .12, p < .001), see Table 11 for 
regression table. The results of the regression also indicated that the model only 
explained a small 4.6% of the variance (R
2
adjusted =.036, F(3,297) = 4.73, p = . 003). 
 
B. STUDY 2 
1. Purpose 
As the next step towards systematically exploring the relationship between social 
class and beliefs about inequality, the second study also manipulated high and low social 
class between subjects and measured the effects on support for Social Justice and 
Fairness. However, Study 2 differed from Study 1 as it measured these beliefs using 
ratings of two sets of hypothetical real-world scenarios rather than scale items. Although 
items from scales provide a more direct way of measuring beliefs, real-world scenarios 
can be presented without politicized language that may confound the results. Moreover, 
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the scenarios were designed to present conflict between the two values allowing 
acceptability ratings to serve as a measure of the extent to which participants would 
uphold one value at the expense of the other.  
The hypothesized outcomes were that participants in the high social class 
condition would report higher acceptability of the Fair but Unjust scenarios and lower 
acceptability of the Socially Just but Unfair scenarios compared to participants in the 
control and low social class conditions, and participants in the low social class condition 
would report lower acceptability of the Fair but Unjust scenarios and higher acceptability 
of the Socially Just but Unfair scenarios. Moreover, similar to Study 1, a majority of the 
variance in both dependent measures will be unexplained by the manipulation, but 
participants’ individuated/categorical perspective will be a strong predictor.   
2. Methods 
a. Participants 
Participants were again recruited online from a diverse and inclusive population 
through Amazon Mechanical Turk in January of 2017, and were screened to ensure they 
had not completed the prior study. Although 304 participants began the study, nine 
participants were excluded for incomplete responses, or if the time they took to complete 
the study was more than three standard deviations above the mean completion time (M = 
6.8 minutes). Ultimately, 296 participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions. Participants provided informed consent and received monetary compensation 
for their participation of $0.45, which reflects norms on the MTurk platform. 
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 82 (M = 36.2 years, SD = 11.69). Fifty-five 
percent of the participants were female. The majority of participants described 
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themselves as White (76.7%), 7.1% Black, 5.4% Hispanic/Latino/a, 8.8% Asian/Pacific 
Islander, and 2% multiethnic.  
All participants were located in the U.S. while participating in the study, and 
94.3% were born in the U.S. (16 participants were born outside of the US). In terms of 
current location, 56% of participants were reporting from states that voted for a 
conservative presidential candidate in the majority of the last eight elections (“red” 
states); forty-four percent of participants were located in states that voted for a liberal 
presidential candidate in the majority of the last eight elections (“blue” states).  
In terms of education, 17% of participants reported having a high school degree or 
GED, 30% associate’s degree or some college, 37% bachelor’s degree, 12.5% master’s, 
and 3.4% reported having completed advanced graduate work. Participants also reported 
household income ranges: median reported household income range was $50,000 - 
$59,999, similar to the national median ($50,000 - $59,999, Census 2015).  
b. Materials 
1) Social Class Manipulation 
All participants completed the same social class manipulation from Study 1 and 
again indicated their relative social class position on the ten-rung ladder representing 
Subjective Social Class.  
2) Social Justice & Fairness Scenarios 
Study 2 used acceptability ratings (from 1 to 7, 1 = “not at all acceptable” and 7 = 
“very acceptable”) of hypothetical scenarios as the dependent variable rather than the 
scale items. Each of the 10 scenarios pitted fairness and social justice values against each 
other such that they showcase instances where input-based deservingness rules create a 
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skewed distribution across groups (five scenarios α = .81), or instances where rules that 
support group membership-based equality violate individual deservingness (five 
scenarios α = .74). All of the scenarios were personally developed and tested for 
reliability by the researcher. They were originally inspired by Rob Reich’s example of the 
drawbacks of a seemingly moral act (parents donating to their child’s public school) 
(Reich, 2013).  
An example of a Fairness scenario is: 
“In a city neighborhood, parents donate a great deal of money to their children’s public 
school. Other public schools in the city with lower income families get no additional 
funds from parents. How acceptable is it that parents donate a great deal of money to 
their children’s school?” 
An example of a Social Justice scenario is: 
“Students at a major university are admitted based on a combination of factors, including 
academic achievement, past hardship, and group membership. Some students with better 
academic records are not admitted to the university. How acceptable is it that students at 
a major university are admitted based on a combination of factors?” 
[See Appendix D for a list of all scenarios] 
3) Measures of Individuated/Categorical Thinking 
 Participants completed the same items from both the Kimchi-Palmer figures task 
(eight items, α = .96) and the Behavioral Identification Form (eight items, α = .70) from 
Study 1.  
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c. Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: a control 
condition (n = 123), a high social class condition (n = 82), and a low social class 
condition (n = 91). Participants first completed the rank ladder manipulation task for 
either high or low social class (the control condition did not complete any task but did see 
the description of the ladder) and then indicated their position on the ladder. Participants 
in all three conditions then provided acceptability ratings for all ten scenarios in random 
order. An image of the ladder remained on screen to strengthen the manipulation for the 
experimental conditions. Participants’ responses were scored in two ways: a combined 
score of acceptability of all of the scenarios where the Fairness scores were reverse-
scored, and a two-part score of acceptability for each type of scenario. However, the 
mixed scenario scoring had lower reliability (α = .59) and the two sets of scenarios 
appeared to be distributed differently so analyses used two separate scores for each set of 
scenarios. Last, all participants completed the Kimchi-Palmer figure task and the BIF 
items similar to Study 1, and provided demographic information including age, race, 
gender, political identity, religiosity, income, occupation, and educational attainment 
level [see Appendix G for full demographic survey].   
3. Results 
a. Analytic Plan 
First, to examine the effects of the social class manipulation on SSS position, and 
ratings of social justice and fairness scenarios, a multivariate one-way analysis of 
variance was used to compare means across participants in the three conditions. In the 
absence of a successful manipulation, self-ratings of SSS position were used as a 
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continuous measure in analyses examining its association with scenario ratings. Second, 
multiple regression analyses examine the ability of average scores on the Kimchi-Palmer 
figures task and the Behavioral Identification Form, along with SSS position, to predict 
scenario ratings. Third, post-hoc analyses included demographic variables, especially 
political identity, as covariates in an attempt to explore the effect of related (and possibly 
confounding) variables.  
b. Primary Analyses 
Means and standard deviations for positions on the Subjective Social Status (SSS) 
ladder and average ratings of the Fair but Socially Unjust (FUJ) and Socially Just but 
Unfair (JUF) scenarios are presented in Table 12. Overall, participants reported SSS 
positions at the midpoint (M = 5.00, SD = 1.7), and support of Socially Just but Unfair 
scenarios (M = 3.79, SD = 1.19) was slightly higher than that of Fair but Unjust scenarios 
(M = 3.41, SD = 1.31), which had slightly greater variance. The assumption of normality 
was tested using the Shapiro-Wilke statistic, which was significant for both FUJ and JUF 
ratings (Fairness S-W statistic = .974, df = 296, p < .001; Social Justice S-W statistic = 
.989, df = 296, p = .02). However, histograms and skewness statistics suggest that the 
data does not depart egregiously from normality (FUJ skewness statistic = -.52, SE = .14; 
JUF skewness statistic = .04, SE = .14), and square transformations do not result in great 
changes in the distributions.  
First, to test the effectiveness of the social class manipulation, a one-way analysis 
of variance compared participants assigned to the three conditions (control = 0, high 
social class manipulation = 1, and low social class manipulation = 2) to the measure of 
relative social class (MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status, SSS) asking 
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participants to place themselves on a social class ladder with ten rungs from lowest to 
highest. The results of this analysis were found to be statistically non-significant 
(F(2,293) =.813, p = .45) indicating that the social class manipulation task was again 
unsuccessful at influencing participants’ report of their relative social class. In addition, 
as the scenarios were correlated (r(296) = .19, p = .001) and both types included elements 
of both Fairness and Social Justice, a multivariate one-way analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) was used to analyze the effect of condition on ratings of both sets of 
scenarios. The results of this analysis were also statistically non-significant overall (F(4, 
586) = 1.873, p = .11). See Tables 13 and 14 for detailed ANOVA tables. In addition, 
although the conditions differed in sample size, Levene's test indicated no violation of 
homogeneity of variance (SSS: F = .09, p = .91; Fairness F = .47, p = .63, Social Justice F 
= .31, p = .74). 
Thus, as the relative social class manipulation in each condition was largely 
unsuccessful at manipulating the SSS position and ratings of most scenarios, further 
analyses used participants' reports of their SSS position on the ladder as a continuous 
measure of perceived relative social class.  
A Pearson product-moment correlation explored the relationship between the ten-
rung SSS ladder, average ratings of the five Just but Unfair scenarios, and average ratings 
of the five Fair but Unjust scenarios. This analysis was found to be statistically 
significant for SSS and JUF scenarios, r(296) = -.12, p = .04, indicating a small negative 
relationship. SSS was positively related to FUJ scenarios (r(296) = .19, p = .001). Scores 
on the eight-item Kimchi-Palmer Figures task were not correlated with any other 
dependent variables, but the eight-item Behavior Identification Form was negatively 
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associated with ratings of Fair but Unjust scenarios (r(296) = -.14, p = .014). See Table 
15 for full correlations table.  
Next, two sets of hierarchical multiple regressions were used to examine the 
efficacy of predicting Socially Just but Unfair (JUF) ratings with position on the SSS 
ladder and either scores on the Kimchi-Palmer figure task or the Behavioral Identification 
Form (BIF). The interaction between SSS and the cognitive measures was entered as a 
predictor in the second step to allow the first step to remain a model with only main 
effects. In the first regression analysis, it was found that SSS was a marginally significant 
predictor of JUF ratings (β = -.08, p = .05), but the Kimchi-Palmer Figures task was not 
significant (β = -.12, p = .43) and the interaction was not significant (β = -.05, p = .63). 
The results of the regression suggested a very small effect: the full model explained only 
1.7% of the variance (R
2
adjusted =.007, F(3,292) = 1.71, p = .17). Similarly, in the second 
regression analysis, it was found that SSS significantly predicted Just but Unfair 
scenarios (β = -.08, p = .048), but the BIF did not (β = -.36, p = .18) and the interaction 
was not significant (β = -.15, p = .35). Again, SSS and the BIF accounted for very little of 
the variance in JUF ratings (R
2
adjusted =.013, F(3,292) = 2.34, p = .07). See Tables 16 and 
17 for regression tables.  
Two similar sets of hierarchical multiple regressions were used to examine the 
efficacy of predicting Fair but Socially Unjust scores with positions on the SSS ladder 
and either scores on the Kimchi-Palmer task or the Behavioral Identification Form (BIF). 
The interaction between SSS and the cognitive measures was entered as a predictor in the 
second step.  
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It was found that SSS significantly predicted FUJ ratings (β = .14, p = .001), but 
the Kimchi-Palmer Figures did not (β = -.078, p = .65) and the interaction was not 
significant (β = -.06, p = .55). The results of the regression suggested a small effect: the 
two predictors independently explained only 3.8% of the variance (R
2
adjusted =.028, 
F(3,292) = 3.85, p = .01). 
Interestingly, in the models including the BIF, it was found that SSS again 
significantly predicted FUJ ratings (β = .15, p = .001), but the BIF did as well (β = -.78, p 
= .007). The interaction was not significant (β = -.18, p = .30), indicating that the main 
effects of relative social class and construal level as measured by the BIF were 
statistically significant predictors of acceptability of Fair but Socially Unjust scenarios. 
The regression equation for predicting acceptability of Fair but Unjust scenarios from 
relative social class and construal level as measured by the BIF was found to be Y = .15x1 
- .78x2 + 3.07. Overall, however, this model only accounted for 6.4% of the variability 
(R
2
adjusted =.054, F(3,292) = 3.85, p = .01), suggesting that an exploration of other related 
variables is warranted. See Tables 18 and 19 for regression tables.  
c. Post-hoc Analyses 
Next, several demographic variables were explored as covariates in relation to the 
ratings of scenarios. Acceptability of Socially Just but Unfair scenarios was negatively 
associated with political identity, r(296) = -.27, p < .001. The "political identity" variable 
was a composite measure averaging responses to two items related to the extent to which 
participants’ identified with the labels “liberal/conservative” and “Democrat/Republican” 
on a scale from 1 = “Not at all” to 7 = “Very.” Conversely, political identity was 
positively associated with acceptability of Fair but Socially Unjust scenarios, r(296) = 
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.42, p < .001. FUJ scenarios were also positively associated with objective household 
income range, r(296) = .20, p < .001, and differed across gender with males slightly more 
approving (mean difference = .45, t(292) = 2.95, p = .003). As can be expected, relative 
social class (SSS) was positively associated with income (r(296) = .56, p < .001), 
conservative political identity (r(302) = .13, p = .02), and education (F(7,288) = 3.14, p = 
.003) across 8 increasingly greater education levels. See Table 15 for correlations table. 
In sum, of the seven demographic variables explored, three (political identity, household 
income range, and education) again seemed most relevant and influential to the 
dependent variables of relative social class, Fairness, and Social Justice.  
The relationship between relative social class and acceptability ratings of the two 
sets of scenarios was subjected to two first-order partial correlations in order to explore 
the relationships controlling for the effects of education and political identity. When 
education level is controlled for, the first-order correlations between relative social class 
and both sets of scenarios remain statistically significant (JUF r(293) = -.13, p = .025; 
FUJ r(293) = .21, p < .001). However, when political identity is controlled for, only the 
first-order correlation between relative social class and Fair but Socially Unjust scenarios 
remains statistically significant (JUF r(293) = -.09, p = .13; FUJ r(293) = .15, p = .01; see 
Table 20).  
Second, because political identity had the strongest pattern of association with all 
three variables, one-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) compared participants 
assigned to the three conditions on the measure of relative social class and a MANCOVA 
compared them on acceptability of both sets of scenarios, while controlling for the effects 
of political identity. The ANCOVA on condition and SSS position was not found to be 
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statistically significant (F(2,290) = .84, p = .43), indicating that the social class 
manipulation task was not successful at influencing relative social class, even after 
controlling for the influence of political identity. The MANCOVA was, however, 
marginally significant for univariate tests of condition on both sets of scenarios (JUF 
F(2,290) = 2.42, p = .09; FUJ F(2,290) = 2.47, p = .09). See Tables 21 and 22 for details.  
Third, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used to test if SSS and 
political identity could significantly predict participants' acceptability ratings of Socially 
Just but Unfair scenarios. Their interaction was entered in the second step. It was found 
that political identity significantly predicted JUF (β = -.19, p < .001), but SSS did not (β 
= -.06, p = .13), see Table 23 for details. The interaction was not significant (β = .004, p = 
.89). The results of the regression also indicated that this model explained only 8.2% of 
the variance (R
2
adjusted =.07 F(3,292) = 8.66, p < .001).  
Similarly, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used to test if SSS, 
political identity, and the BIF could significantly predict participants' acceptability ratings 
of Fair but Unjust scenarios. Their two- way interactions were entered in the second step. 
Gender and the dummy-coded conditions were also included as main effects. It was 
found that SSS significantly predicted FUJ (β = .11, p = .009), as did political identity (β 
= .31, p < .001), and the BIF (β = -.74, p = .004). Moreover, gender (β = -.44, p = .001) 
and only the low social class manipulation condition (compared to the control) were also 
significant predictors (β = -.39, p = .015). However, the interactions were not significant 
(see Table 24 for details). The results of the regression also indicated that full model 
explained a moderate 26.3% of the variance (R
2
adjusted =.24 F(10,283) = 10.08, p < .001).  
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As political identity and SSS were positively correlated (r(296) = .13, p = .02), a 
mediation model was explored to attempt to represent a more accurate picture of how the 
two variables were related to ratings of Fair but Unjust scenarios. Results of the analysis 
showed that the relationship between relative social class and social justice beliefs was 
only partially mediated by political identity. As Figure 2 demonstrates, the standardized 
regression coefficient between relative social class and political identity was statistically 
significant (β = .13, p = .02), as was the standardized regression coefficient between 
political identity and social justice beliefs (β = .32, p < .001). The standardized indirect 
effect was -.05, CI [.01, .10]. The significance of this indirect effect was tested using 
bootstrapping procedures. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect was .04, and 
the 95% confidence interval ranged from .008 to .08. However, political identity as the 
mediator could only account for about a third of the total effect, PM = .28.  
4. Discussion of Studies 1 & 2 
 In Study 1, relative social class manipulations were unsuccessful at influencing 
participants’ position on the Subjective Social Status ladder scale measure and the 
Fairness and Social Justice scales, even when controlling for the effects of participant 
political identity. In Study 2, the manipulation was again unsuccessful at influencing both 
participants’ SSS position and average ratings of scenarios presenting conflict between 
fairness and social justice. Although the task has been used successfully in past research 
and was replicated in identical detail in these studies, it may be that for the purposes of 
these studies, writing about interactions with people at the top or bottom of the SSS 
ladder is not a sufficiently influential activity to replace participants’ prior perceptions of 
their social class.  
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 However, relative social class, as measured by SSS position, was a significant 
negative predictor of endorsement of stated social justice principles but not fairness 
principles in Study 1, which supported the hypotheses indirectly. In Study 2, this pattern 
was expanded upon in that SSS did not significantly predict acceptability of scenarios 
where social justice was upheld, but it did negatively predict acceptability of scenarios 
where social justice was violated. That is, the lower in social class people consider 
themselves overall, the more supportive of Social Justice they are, and they are especially 
more sensitive to violations of social justice. Furthermore, although conservative political 
identity and relative social class were positively associated, only about a third of this 
effect of social class could be explained by political identity. Moreover, the effects of 
relative social class were associated with Social Justice beliefs even beyond the effects of 
related demographic variables such as political identity, education, and household income 
range.  
 Politics was, however, a strong independent predictor of both the scale items and 
the scenarios in both studies. Interestingly, conservative political identity was a stronger 
negative predictor of the scale items (R
2
 = 25%) than of the Socially Just but Unfair 
scenario ratings (R
2
 = 8%). Perhaps political identity is more relevant to stated attitudes 
than to upholding Social Justice when in conflict with Fairness in real-world scenarios.  
 In terms of cognition, the Kimchi-Palmer local-global task was not able to add to 
the understanding of social justice and fairness. The Behavior Identification Form 
measuring high and low construal level did negatively predict the acceptability of Fair 
but Socially Unjust scenarios. Essentially, participants who were thinking at a higher, 
more abstract level were significantly more likely to object to the violation of social 
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justice. The two cognitive measures are intended to measure related but separate 
concepts: local/global thinking and higher/lower construal levels. It may be that, for the 
purposes of this research, the BIF is a more relevant measure of cognition.  
 Lastly, this objection to violations of social justice was predicted by several 
variables independently of each other. These included higher level thinking from the BIF, 
a more liberal political identity, lower relative social class, being asked to write about an 
interaction with someone higher in social class (condition 2), and being female. The 
effect of the low social class condition is not, however, mediated by any change in SSS 
position. Therefore, it remains to be understood what effect this manipulation is actually 
having: is the experience of writing about someone who is worse off than you generating 
an emotional reaction such as empathy or general negative affect?  
 Interestingly, the gender effect, although small, is robust - but has not been seen 
in previous studies and was not mediated by politics, nor was it associated with other 
demographic variables. This result may also suggest that future research should more 
closely examine the role of two other concepts that are also affected by gender: empathy 
and interdependence (Varnum, Blaise, Hampton & Brewer, 2015).  
 Overall, Studies 1 and 2 suggest that social class has a unique but small effect on 
the extent to which people believe in and support social justice - but not on thinking 
about fairness, which remains a fairly universal value. Abstract thinking appears to play 
an independent role in objecting to the violation of social justice principles, but not 
fairness principles.  
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CHAPTER 4 
STUDIES 3 & 4  
A. STUDY 3 
1. Purpose 
In Studies 1 and 2, the effects of high and low social class on support for Social 
Justice and Fairness were explored with cognitive perspective not manipulated, but 
measured. In Study 3, the effects of manipulated individuated or categorical cognitive 
perspective on support for Social Justice and Fairness were examined, and social class 
was measured. In this way, Study 3 aimed to test the individuated/categorical cognitive 
perspective as a predictor of support for Social Justice (and Fairness). Study 3 asked 
participants to use a concrete/individuated perspective or an abstract/categorical 
perspective, and then measured their attitudes using the Social Justice and Fairness 
scales. Study 4 was different only in that the dependent measure was the ten scenarios 
used in Study 2. The hypothesized outcome in Study 3 was that compared to the control 
group, participants primed with a concrete/individuated perspective would have lower 
scores on the Social Justice measures but not Fairness, and participants primed with an 
abstract/categorical perspective will show higher support of Social Justice but not 
Fairness.  
2. Methods 
a. Participants 
Participants were again recruited online from a diverse and inclusive population 
through Amazon Mechanical Turk in January of 2017, and were screened to ensure they 
had not completed the prior studies. Although 310 participants began the study, 15 
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participants were excluded for incomplete responses, or if the time they took to complete 
the study was more than three standard deviations above the mean completion time (M = 
5.3 minutes). Ultimately, 295 participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions. Participants provided informed consent and received monetary compensation 
for their participation of $0.35, which reflects norms on the MTurk platform. 
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 74 (M = 39.2 years, SD = 13.1). 
Approximately 50.5% of the participants were female. The majority of participants 
described themselves as White (75.9%), 9% Black, 3.8% Hispanic/Latino/a, 9% 
Asian/Pacific Islander, and 2.4% multiethnic.  
All participants were located in the US while participating in the study, and 95% 
were born in the US (16 participants were born outside of the US). In terms of current 
location, 53% of participants were reporting from states that voted for a conservative 
presidential candidate in the majority of the last eight elections (“red” states); forty-seven 
percent of participants were located in states that voted for a liberal presidential candidate 
in the majority of the last eight elections (“blue” states).  
In terms of education, 16.5% of participants reported having a high school degree 
or GED, 31.6% associate’s degree or some college, 35.7% bachelor’s degree, 11% 
master’s degree, and 5.2% reported having completed advanced graduate work. 
Participants also reported household income ranges: median reported household income 
range was $50,000 - $59,999, similar to the national median ($50,000 - $59,999, Census 
2015).  
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b. Materials 
1) Individuated/Categorical Perspective Manipulation 
Participants in experimental conditions completed one of the versions of the 
Construal Level priming task drawn from Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi (2006). 
This manipulation proved successful in a past study at affecting support for Social Justice 
(described above), although that study did not incorporate social class or the necessary 
analyses and, therefore, will be extended here. In this task, the instructions to the 
participant determine whether the task primes a concrete construal or an abstract 
construal level. The “abstract” directions are to list the larger categories that define each 
of 20 distinct items. The “concrete” directions were to list specific examples of the same 
20 items. Participants in the control condition were simply asked to read the list of 20 
items [see Appendix H for full task stimuli and directions].  
2) Social Justice and Fairness Measures 
 Unique insights were provided by the measures and scenarios, so both dependent 
measures were utilized in Studies 3 and 4. For Study 3, participants completed the same 
five-item Social Justice scale (α = .91) and the five-item Fairness scale (α = .82) in 
random order as used in Study 1.  
3) Social Class Measures 
 Participants saw the MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status used in the 
previous two studies. A description of the ladder and its ten rungs as representing society 
was provided and participants were asked to indicate which of the ten rungs might best 
represent their social class position in US society from 1 - “Worst off” to 10 - “Best off.” 
4) Measures of Individuated/Categorical Thinking 
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 Participants completed the first four items from both the Kimchi-Palmer figures 
task (four items, α = .92) and the Behavioral Identification Form (four items, α = .55) 
from the previous studies.   
c. Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions in (3x1): 
concrete/individuated perspective (n = 86), abstract/categorical perspective (n = 82), and 
a control condition (n = 127). Participants first completed the cognitive perspective 
manipulation task (the control condition did not complete any task but saw the list of 
words). Participants in all three conditions then completed the Social Justice/Fairness 
scale items in random order. Then, participants completed the four-item Kimchi-Palmer 
task, then the four-item BIF. Lastly, all participants provided demographic information 
including the SSS ladder measure, age, race, gender, political identity, religiosity, 
income, occupation, and educational attainment level [see Appendix G for full 
demographic survey].     
3. Results 
a. Analytic Plan 
First, to examine the effects of the construal level task on social justice and 
fairness beliefs, a one-way analysis of variance was used to compare means across 
participants in the three conditions. Second, multiple regression analyses examined the 
ability of average scores on the Kimchi-Palmer figures task and the Behavioral 
Identification Form, along with measured SSS position, to predict social justice and 
fairness beliefs. Third, post-hoc analyses included demographic variables, especially 
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political identity, as covariates in an attempt to explore the effect of related (and possibly 
confounding) variables.  
b. Primary Analyses 
Means and standard deviations for positions on the Subjective Social Status (SSS) 
ladder and average scores on the Fairness and Social Justice scales are presented in Table 
25.  Overall, participants reported SSS positions close to the midpoint (M = 5.05, SD = 
1.82), and support of Fairness (M = 5.22, SD = 1.00) was slightly higher than support of 
Social Justice (M = 5.08, SD = 1.37), which had slightly greater variance. The 
assumption of normality was tested using the Shapiro-Wilke statistic, which was 
significant for both Fairness and Social Justice scores (Fairness S-W statistic = .975, df = 
295, p < .001; Social Justice S-W statistic = .959, df = 295, p < .001). Although 
histograms and skewness statistics suggested negatively skewed data (Fairness skewness 
statistic = -.40 SE = .14; Social Justice skewness statistic = -.39, SE = .14), square 
transformations did not restore normality. Furthermore, several dozen responses, 
although extreme, could not be considered outliers and, with no statistical or practical 
motivation to do otherwise, were not removed from the sample. Therefore, where 
appropriate, some non-parametric tests are reported as well.  
First, to test the effectiveness of the construal level manipulation, a one-way 
analysis of variance compared participants assigned to the three conditions (control = 0, 
concrete construal level manipulation = 1, and abstract construal level manipulation = 2) 
to the Fairness and Social Justice scale scores. The results of this analysis were found to 
be statistically non-significant (Fairness F(2,292) = 1.79, p = .17; Social Justice F(2,292) 
= .76, p = .47) indicating that the construal level manipulation task was unsuccessful at 
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influencing participants’ endorsement of the Fairness and Social Justice scales.  See 
Table 26 for detailed ANOVA results. In addition, although the conditions differed in 
sample size, Levene's test indicated no violation of homogeneity of variance (Fairness 
Levene’s Statistic = 1.16, p = .32; Social Justice Levene’s Statistic = .82, p = .44). 
As the data violated assumptions of normality, two (nonparametric) Kruskal-
Wallis H tests were also conducted, which again showed that there were no statistically 
significant differences in Fairness or Social Justice scores between the different 
conditions, Fairness χ2(2) = 2.91, p = .23; Social Justice χ2(2) = .199, p = .37. 
Next, a (nonparametric) Spearman's rank-order correlation explored the 
relationship between the ten-rung SSS, which was gathered at the end with demographic 
information, and average scores on the five-item Fairness and Social Justice scales with 
different results although in the expected directions. With this analysis, SSS and Social 
Justice were significantly negatively correlated (rs(295) = -.12, p = .04) while Fairness  
was not significantly correlated with SSS, rs(295) = .09, p = .13), see Table 28 for full 
correlation table. 
As a baseline measure, the first four items from the BIF and the Kimchi-Palmer 
figures task were also presented to participants at the end of the study.  Possibly because 
they were presented at the end of study when the effects of the priming task may have 
worn off, neither of these measures differed by condition (FKP(2,292) = .13, p = .88; 
FBIF(2,292) = .91, p = .41). Similar to Studies 1 and 2, these were used along with SSS 
position to attempt to predict Fairness and Social Justice scores. Specifically, as the 
previous studies suggested that the BIF is most relevant to the variables studied, the 
average score of this and the ten-rung SSS measure were entered into a hierarchical 
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multiple regression with their interaction entered in the second step. The residuals for 
both of these regressions appeared normally distributed. It was found that neither SSS, 
the BIF, nor their interaction were significant predictors of Social Justice scores (R
2
 = 
.01, F(3,291) = 1.25, p = .29), see Table 29 for regression table. However, the regression 
analysis did suggest that Fairness scores can be predicted by SSS position (β = .07, p = 
.041) but not by the BIF (β = .20, p = .30) or their interaction (β = -.10, p = .35), see 
Table 30 for regression table. The model could only predict about 2% of the variance in 
Fairness scores (R
2
adjusted = .011, F(3,291) = 2.13, p = .10).  
c. Post-hoc Analyses 
Several demographic variables were then explored in relation to the Fairness and 
Social Justice scales using nonparametric Spearman’s rank correlations (see Table 28). 
Fairness was positively associated with political identity, rs(295) = .23, p < .001. This 
variable was a composite measure averaging responses to two items related to the extent 
to which participants’ identified with the labels “liberal/conservative” and 
“Democrat/Republican” on a scale from 1 = “Not at all” to 7 = “Very.”  Conversely, 
political identity was negatively associated with Social Justice beliefs, rs(295) = -.55, p < 
.001. Social Justice was also negatively associated with objective household income 
range, rs(295) = -.15, p = .013. As hypothesized, relative Social Class (SSS) was 
positively associated with income (rs(295) = .62, p < .001), conservative political identity 
(rs(295) = .17, p = .003), and education (F(7,283) = 8.51, p < .01) across 8 increasingly 
greater education levels. No significant differences in the dependent variables was seen 
across gender, ethnicity, or state political identity (i.e. "red" state or "blue" state based on 
how the state had voted in the majority of the last eight presidential elections). In sum, of 
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the seven demographic variables explored, political identity seemed most relevant and 
influential to the dependent variables of Fairness, and Social Justice.    
First, a one-way analysis of covariance compared participants assigned to the 
three conditions to the Fairness and Social Justice scores, controlling for the covariate 
effects of political identity. This analysis was found to be statistically non-significant for 
the effect of condition on Fairness scores (F(2,289) =.618, p = .59) indicating that the 
construal level task was unsuccessful at influencing participants’ support for Fairness 
even after controlling for the influence of political identity. However, this analysis was 
found to be statistically significant for the effect of the interaction between condition and 
political identity (F(2,289) = 6.08, p = .003) indicating a differential relationship between 
political identity and Social Justice scores across manipulated conditions (see Table 31 
for details). The interaction was probed by testing the conditional effects of condition at 
three levels of political identity: one standard deviation below the mean, at the mean, and 
one standard above the mean. This analysis was significant only for the abstract condition 
compared to the control condition; the concrete condition did not differ from the control 
condition. At one standard deviation below the mean of political identity (more 
liberal/Democrat), support for social justice was higher in the abstract condition 
(Mconditional = 6.13) than the control condition (Mconditional = 5.59). At the mean, there were 
no differences between conditions F(2,289) = .26, p = .77). At one standard deviation 
above the mean of political identity (more conservative/Republican), support for social 
justice was lower in the abstract condition (Mconditional = 3.89) than the control condition 
(Mconditional = 4.47).  
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 To further investigate the specifics of this interaction, hierarchical multiple 
regression analysis was used to test if the two manipulation conditions, SSS, political 
identity, and their two-way interactions could significantly predict participants' 
endorsement of Social Justice.  In this model, it was found that SSS did not significantly 
predict Social Justice (β = -.14, p = .09), although political identity did (β = -.56, p < 
.001), and the interaction between SSS and political identity was a marginally significant 
predictor (β = .04, p = .06). In addition, the dummy-coded abstract construal level 
condition was a significant predictor of Social Justice scores compared to the control 
condition (β = 1.02, p = .005) although the concrete condition was not (β = .35, p = .35). 
Lastly, the interaction between the abstract condition and political identity was significant 
(β = 2.98, p = .002) but the interaction between the concrete condition and political 
identity was not (β = -.07, p = .50). The results of the regression indicated that the model 
explained a moderate 33.4% of the variance (R
2
adjusted =.318, F(7,287) = 20.56, p < .001). 
See Table 32 for details and Figure 3 for regression plots.  
In a similar analysis, hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used to test if 
SSS, political identity and the interaction between the two could significantly predict 
participants' endorsement of Fairness.  In this model, it was found that SSS did not 
significantly predict Fairness (β = -.14, p = .09), although political identity did (β = -.56, 
p < .001), and the interaction between SSS and political identity was a marginally 
significant predictor (β = .04, p = .06). The results of the regression indicated that the 
model explained a moderate 33.4% of the variance (R
2
adjusted =.318, F(7,287) = 20.56, p < 
.001). 
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B. STUDY 4 
1.  Purpose 
 In Study 4, individuated or categorical cognitive perspective was manipulated 
and the effects were measured on acceptability ratings of scenarios presenting conflict 
between social justice and fairness; social class was then measured using the ten-rung 
SSS ladder. In this way, Study 4 aimed to test the individuated/categorical cognitive 
perspective as a predictor of support for violations of social justice and fairness. Study 4 
asked participants to use a concrete/individuated perspective or an abstract/categorical 
perspective, and then measured their attitudes using the scenarios from Study 2. The 
hypothesized outcome in Study 4 was that compared to the control and 
concrete/individuated group, participants primed with an abstract/categorical perspective 
would indicate lower acceptability of the Fair but Socially Unjust scenarios, and higher 
acceptability of Socially Just but Unfair scenarios.  
2. Methods 
a. Participants 
Participants were again recruited online from a diverse and inclusive population 
through Amazon Mechanical Turk in January of 2017, and were screened to ensure they 
had not completed the prior studies. Although 302 participants began the study, 21 
participants were excluded for incomplete responses, or if the time they took to complete 
the study was more than three standard deviations above the mean completion time (M = 
6.9. Ultimately, 281 participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. 
Participants provided informed consent and received monetary compensation for their 
participation of $0.45, which reflects norms on the MTurk platform. 
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Participants ranged in age from 20 to 84 (M = 39 years, SD = 13.2). 
Approximately 50.9% of the participants were female. The majority of participants 
described themselves as White (79.7%), 5% Black, 5.3% Hispanic/Latino/a, 7.8% 
Asian/Pacific Islander, and 2.1% multiethnic.  
All participants were located in the U.S. while participating in the study, and 
96.4% were born in the U.S. (11 participants were born outside of the US). In terms of 
current location, 51% of participants were reporting from states that voted for a 
conservative presidential candidate in the majority of the last eight elections (“red” 
states); forty-nine percent of participants were located in states that voted for a liberal 
presidential candidate in the majority of the last eight elections (“blue” states).  
In terms of education, 18.9% of participants reported having a high school degree 
or GED, 29.9% associate’s degree or some college, 33.8% bachelor’s degree, 14.6% 
master’s degree, and 2.8% reported having completed advanced graduate work. 
Participants also reported household income ranges: median reported household income 
range was $50,000 - $59,999, similar to the national median ($50,000 - $59,999, Census 
2015).  
b. Materials 
1) Individuated/Categorical Perspective Manipulation 
Participants in experimental conditions completed one of the versions of the 
Construal Level priming task drawn from Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi (2006) 
as in Study 3 [see Appendix H for full task stimuli and directions].  
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2) Social Justice and Fairness Scenarios 
Study 4 used acceptability ratings (from 1 to 7, 1 = “not at all acceptable” and 7 = 
“very acceptable”) of the same hypothetical scenarios from Study 2 as the dependent 
variable rather than the scale items. Each of the 10 scenarios pitted fairness and social 
justice values against each other such that they showcase instances where input-based 
deservingness rules create a skewed distribution across groups (five scenarios, α = .78), 
or instances where rules that support group membership-based equality violate individual 
deservingness (five scenarios, α = .72). See Appendix D for full list of scenarios. 
Analyses utilized these scenarios as two separate sets as their mixed and reverse-coded 
reliability was lower (ten scenarios, α = .59).  
3) Social Class Measure 
 Participants saw the MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status used in the 
previous two studies. A description of the ladder and its ten rungs as representing society 
was provided and participants were asked to indicate which of the ten rungs might best 
represent their social class position in US society from 1 - “Worst off” to 10 - “Best off.” 
4) Measures of Individuated/Categorical Thinking 
 Participants completed the Behavioral Identification Form (eight items, α = .68) 
from the previous studies. The Kimchi-Palmer task was omitted as no previous analyses 
suggested it was a relevant measure to the variables studied.  
c. Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions in (3x1): 
concrete/individuated perspective (n = 101), abstract/categorical perspective (n = 62), and 
a control condition (n = 118). Participants first completed the cognitive perspective 
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manipulation task (the control condition did not complete any task but saw the list of 
words). Participants in all three conditions then rated all ten scenarios in random order. 
Then, participants completed the eight-item BIF. Lastly, all participants provided 
demographic information including the SSS ladder measure, age, race, gender, political 
identity, religiosity, income, occupation, and educational attainment level [see Appendix 
G for full demographic survey].     
3. Results 
a. Analytic Plan 
First, to examine the effects of the construal level task on the scenario ratings, a 
multivariate one-way analysis of variance wasused to compare means across participants 
in the three conditions. Second, multiple regression analyses examined the ability of 
average scores on the Behavioral Identification Form, along with SSS position, to predict 
scenario ratings. Third, post-hoc analyses included demographic variables, especially 
political identity, as covariates in an attempt to explore the effect of related (and possibly 
confounding) variables.  
b. Primary Analyses 
Means and standard deviations for positions on the Subjective Social Status (SSS) 
ladder and average scores on the Fair but Socially Unjust (FUJ) and Socially Just but 
Unfair (JUF) scenarios are presented in Table 34.  Overall, participants reported SSS 
positions close to the midpoint (M = 4.98, SD = 1.65), and average acceptability ratings 
of Fair but Socially Unjust scenarios (M = 3.64, SD = 1.27) was slightly lower than 
support of Socially Just but Unfair scenarios (M = 3.73, SD = 1.12). The assumption of 
normality was tested using the Shapiro-Wilke statistic, which was significant for both 
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Fairness and Social Justice scores (Fairness S-W statistic = .988, df = 281, p = .017; 
Social Justice S-W statistic = .988, df = 281, p = .024). However, histograms of the data 
don’t suggest major departures from normality, and square root transformations of the 
positively skewed data did not restore normality. Furthermore, several dozen responses, 
although extreme, could not be considered outliers and, with no statistical or practical 
motivation to do otherwise, were not removed from the sample.  
First, to test the effectiveness of the construal level manipulation, a multivariate 
one-way analysis of variance compared participants assigned to the three conditions 
(control = 0, concrete construal level manipulation = 1, and abstract construal level 
manipulation = 2) to both sets of scenarios. A MANOVA was used over an ANOVA 
because the scenarios were presented together, positively correlated (r(281) = .15, p = 
.01), and included elements of both Fairness and Social Justice principles in each 
scenario.  Additionally, the Box’s M value of 3.80 was associated with a p value of .709, 
which suggests that the covariance matrices between the groups can be assumed equal for 
the purposes of the MANOVA even though the groups had different sample sizes. The 
results of this analysis were found to be statistically significant overall, F(4,556) = 2.41, p 
= .048.  Specifically, there were no differences between conditions for Fair but Unjust 
scenarios (FUJ), F(2,278) = .08, p = .45 but there were differences between conditions for 
Socially Just but Unfair scenarios (JUF), F(2,278) = 3.41, p = .034) indicating that the 
construal level manipulation task was successful at influencing participants’ acceptability 
ratings of Socially Just but Unfair scenarios.  This effect was small, however (η2 =.02). 
See Table 35 for detailed MANOVA results. A Tukey post hoc test revealed that the 
average acceptability of JUF scenarios was statistically significantly lower in the abstract 
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construal level condition (M = 3.40) than the concrete construal level condition (M = 
3.85, p = .038). There was no statistically significant difference between the abstract and 
control conditions (p = .067, marginal) or the concrete and control conditions (p = .94), 
see Figure 4 for bar chart. In addition, this effect of the abstract construal level condition 
on JUF ratings was not mediated by scores on the BIF, indirect effect omnibus β < .001, 
CI [-.008, .002].  
Next, a Pearson product-moment correlation explored the relationship between 
the ten-rung SSS, which was gathered at the end with demographic information, and 
average acceptability ratings of both FUJ and JUF scenarios. This analysis was found to 
be statistically significant for SSS and FUJ scenarios, r(281) = .193, p = .001, indicating a 
moderate positive relationship. SSS was unrelated to JUF scenarios (r(281) = -.051, p = 
.39). See Table 36 for full correlation table. 
As a baseline measure, the eight-item BIF was also presented to participants at the 
end of the study. This measure was included, rather than the Kimchi-Palmer figures, as 
the previous studies suggested that the BIF was most relevant to the variables studied. 
Again perhaps because the measure was presented much later after the manipulation 
tasks, there were no differences in the BIF across conditions (F(2,278) = .03, p = .97). 
Similar to the previous studies, these were used along with SSS position to attempt to 
predict ratings of both sets of scenarios. Specifically, the average score of this and the 
ten-rung SSS measure were entered into a hierarchical multiple regression with their 
interaction entered in the second step. The residuals of both of these regression analyses 
appeared normally distributed. It was found that neither SSS, the BIF, nor their 
interaction were significant predictors of Socially Just but Unfair scenarios (R
2
 = .006, 
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F(3, 277) = .58, p = .63), see Table 37 for details. However, the regression analysis did 
suggest that FUJ ratings can be predicted by SSS position (β = .16, p = .001) and 
marginally by the BIF (β = -.48, p = .10) but not by their interaction (β = -.05, p = .81), 
see Table 38 for details. The complete model predicted only about 4.7% of the variance 
in FUJ ratings (R
2
adjusted = .036, F(3,277) = 4.51, p = .004).  
c. Post-hoc Analyses 
To attempt to improve this model, several demographic variables were then 
explored in relation to the ladder and both sets of scenarios. FUJ ratings were positively 
associated with political identity, r(281) = .46, p < .001. This variable was a composite 
measure averaging responses to two items related to the extent to which participants’ 
identified with the labels “liberal/conservative” and “Democrat/Republican” on a scale 
from 1 = “Not at all” to 7 = “Very.”  FUJ ratings were also lower for females, F(1,279) = 
9.78, p = .002. Conversely, political identity was negatively associated with JUF ratings, 
r(281) = -.17, p = .004 (see Table 36 for full correlations table). JUF ratings were also 
negatively associated with age, r(281) = -.18, p = .002, and differed across ethnicity, 
F(5,275) = 4.06, p = .001. Specifically, a Tukey post hoc test revealed that the average 
acceptability of JUF scenarios was statistically significantly higher for Blacks/African 
Americans (M = 4.74) than for Whites (M = 3.71, p = .009), Asians (M = 3.49, p = .027), 
and Hispanic/Latino/as (M = 3.51, p = .014). Also, as can be expected, relative Social 
Class (SSS) was positively associated with income (r(281) = .56, p < .001), conservative 
political identity (r(281) = .14, p = .018), and education (F(6,274) = 5.69, p < .001) across 
8 increasingly greater education levels. In sum, of the seven demographic variables 
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explored, political identity, gender, and ethnicity seemed most relevant and influential to 
the dependent variables.  
Thus, a multivariate one-way analysis of covariance was used to compare 
participants assigned to the three conditions to the two sets of scenarios, controlling for 
the covariate effects of the strongest variable, political identity. This analysis was found 
to be statistically non-significant for the effect of condition overall (F(4,572) = 1.78, p = 
.13) indicating that the construal level task was unsuccessful at influencing participants’ 
ratings of the scenarios after controlling for the influence of political identity. Effect sizes 
(η2) show that political identity has a stronger effect on FUJ ratings than JUF (η2 = .22 
versus .03), see Table 39 for details.  
To determine if these demographic variables could contribute to predicting ratings 
of scenarios, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis tested if SSS, the BIF, gender, 
political identity could significantly predict participants' ratings of Fair but Socially 
Unjust scenarios. Their two-way interactions were entered in the second step. In the main 
effects model, it was found that SSS significantly predicted FUJ ratings (β = .12, p = 
.005), as did political identity (β = .32, p < .001), and gender (β = -.46, p = .001), while 
the BIF was marginally significant (β = -.51, p = .053). None of the two-way interactions 
were significant. The results of the regression indicated that the full model explained a 
moderate 26.8% of the variance (R
2
adjusted =.249, F(7,273) = 14.28, p < .001), see Table 
40 for regression table. 
In a similar analysis, hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used to test if 
SSS, political identity, and the dummy-coded conditions could predict participants’ 
ratings of Socially Just but Unfair scenarios. Their two-way interactions were entered in 
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the second step, and the regression compared the abstract and control conditions to the 
concrete condition, as the MANOVA indicated this as the key difference. In the main 
effects model, it was found that SSS did not significantly predict JUF ratings (β = -.01, p 
= .73), although political identity did (β = -.10, p = .009). In addition, the dummy-coded 
abstract construal level condition was a significant predictor of JUF ratings compared to 
the concrete condition (β = -.41, p = .023) although the control condition was not (β = -
.07, p = .67). None of the two-way interactions were significant predictors. See Table 41 
for regression table. The results of the regression analysis indicated that the model 
explained only 5.8% of the variance (R
2
adjusted =.034, F(7,283) = 2.40, p = .022). 
4. Discussion of Studies 3 & 4 
 In Study 3, construal level manipulations were unsuccessful at influencing 
participants’ responses on the Fairness scale, even when controlling for the effects of 
participant political identity; there was, however, a stronger negative relationship 
between Political Identity and Social Justice responses in the abstract construal level 
condition compared to the concrete and control conditions. Influencing abstract or 
categorical thinking appears to have increased endorsement of Social Justice for liberals 
but decreased support for Social Justice for conservatives, judging by the spread of the 
residuals. In Study 4, the manipulation was unsuccessful at influencing participants’ 
average ratings of scenarios where Social Justice was violated, but, contrary to 
hypotheses, the abstract condition did reduce ratings of scenarios where Fairness was 
violated. Interestingly, this effect was not explained by a change in construal level as 
measured by the BIF. It may be that inducing abstract or categorical thinking highlights 
the conflict in violating one principal in favor of another overall. However, the effect of 
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condition here is very small (η2 =.02) and may be due to the unequal sample sizes, even 
though tests showed no difference in variance across conditions.  
 In Study 3, relative social class, as measured by SSS position, was not a 
significant predictor of endorsement of social justice or fairness principles; issues with 
the non-normal distribution of the data may have played a role in this finding being 
contrary to Study 1’s findings. In Study 4, SSS did significantly predict acceptability of 
scenarios where social justice was violated. That is, the lower in social class people 
consider themselves, the more disapproving they were of violations of social justice. 
 Politics was, however, a strong independent predictor of both the scale items and 
the scenarios in both studies. Interestingly, conservative political identity was a stronger 
positive predictor of the Fair but Socially Unjust scenarios than of the Socially Just but 
Unfair scenario ratings. Again, political identity may have less to do with upholding 
Social Justice than it does with supporting it when in conflict with Fairness.   
 In terms of cognition, the Behavior Identification Form measuring high and low 
construal level did not predict the scale responses in Study 3, but in Study 4 it did 
marginally and negatively predict approval of scenarios where Social Justice was 
violated. Essentially, participants who were thinking at a higher, more abstract level were 
significantly more likely to object to the violation of social justice.  
 Lastly, this objection to violations of social justice was predicted by several 
variables independently of each other. These included higher level thinking from the BIF, 
a more liberal political identity, lower relative social class, and being female. Disapproval 
of the violation of Fairness was interestingly predicted only by conservative political 
identity and being in the abstract construal level condition. 
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  Overall, Studies 3 and 4 suggest that abstract versus concrete thinking appears to 
play an independent role in the extent to which liberals support social justice principles, 
and the extent to which people object to the violation of Fairness principles. Social class 
appears to have a unique but small effect on the extent to which people object to 
violations of social justice - but not on thinking about fairness, which remains a fairly 
universal value.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The studies proposed in this dissertation aimed to further explore the relationship 
between social class and beliefs about inequality. Studies 1 and 2 manipulated relative 
social class and examined its effects on support for group-based equality (social justice) 
and input-based deservingness (fairness), and also measured individuated versus 
categorical thinking. Studies 3 and 4 manipulated this thinking, tested its effects on 
support for Social Justice and Fairness, and measured social class. This avenue of 
research attempted to demonstrate through measurement and manipulation that an 
individuated or categorical cognitive perspective is one way of understanding the 
complex relationship between social class and beliefs about social justice.  
In general, results suggested that though the experimental portion of the research, the 
SSS manipulation, was not successful, social class as measured by the SSS ladder 
appeared to have a significant effect on support for social justice, but not for fairness. The 
lower participants saw themselves on the ladder of resources and position in society, the 
greater their support for group-based equality. This effect was largely independent of 
political identity, and was particularly demonstrated when participants objected to the 
violation of social justice in order to uphold fairness principles in real-world scenarios 
that brought the two values into conflict. This situation was also the foundation for the 
strongest effects of abstract thinking – higher scores on the BIF decreased approval only 
for scenarios involving the violation of social justice in favor of fairness.  
The ladder manipulation task has been used successfully in similar research and 
manipulation checks in those studies showed significant differences in SSS position 
between participants asked to compare themselves to those at the top versus bottom of the 
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ladder (e.g. Kraus, et al., 2013; Piff, et al., 2010). In Studies 1 and 2, however, the 
manipulation was unsuccessful at influencing SSS positions even though the exact same 
manipulation, image, and instructions were utilized, identical to the above mentioned 
studies. Reasons for this could include the limitations of these samples (although the 
above mentioned research also accessed online MTurk samples), some other flaw in the 
studies’ design, or perhaps simply the “file drawer” problem wherein only manipulations 
that were successful have been published. It may also be that the manipulation is not 
necessarily effective in general: writing a few sentences about hypothetical interactions 
with people at the top or bottom of the SSS ladder is not a sufficiently influential activity 
to replace participants’ prior perceptions of their social class relative to larger society. 
SSS position was, however, positively correlated with education level and income. Job 
type, though, was far more unreliable and was not associated with SSS. This is consistent 
with other research where the sheer variety inherent in job content, function, and 
qualifications leads to either too much complexity or oversimplification in coding, and 
does not allow for accurate association with social class or the creation of a composite 
measure (Seagert, et al., 2007).  
The two types of dependent variables (scale items and scenario ratings) measuring 
support for fairness and social justice also provided insight in different ways across the 
studies. In Studies 1 and 3, where the scale items were used, relative social class was not 
correlated with fairness, but it was negatively correlated with social justice. In Study 1, 
social class was also an independent negative predictor of social justice, but not of 
fairness. The effect sizes are in fact comparable to results in similar studies utilizing the 
MacArthur SSS and measuring related concepts. This was not replicated in Study 3, but 
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the data in this study appear to be more complex and more difficult to interpret due to 
normality issues overall. Another explanation may be that the image of the ladder was 
included with all items to strengthen the SSS manipulation but this was not true of the 
items in Study 3 and no image was used to strengthen the construal level manipulation.  
Interestingly, support for fairness was greater than support for social justice when the 
scale items were presented, but the converse was true for the scenarios: approval of 
Socially Just but Unfair scenarios was slightly higher than approval of Fair but Socially 
Unjust scenarios. One interpretation of this reverse pattern is that the scale items are 
influenced by social desirability and reflect more automatic or shallow politicized 
attitudes, while the scenarios are able to reveal a more complex and enduring belief in 
social justice by bringing it into conflict with fairness and highlighting its relative 
importance. For the scale items, support for social justice and fairness were not 
negatively correlated in either the present studies or previous research, demonstrating that 
many people can endorse both values simultaneously – especially fairness, which has 
high approval across demographic variables. When it came to the scenarios, participants 
were forced to make a choice between them and the impact of this conflict calls for 
further investigation; it remains of interest to understand the characteristics of those who 
continue to support social justice even when fairness is violated. Similar to a 2015 
neuropsychological study that found that higher SES individuals perceived themselves to 
be more empathic but, in fact, showed less response to others’ pain (Varnum, Blaise, 
Hampton & Brewer, 2015), the pattern found here warrants further exploration as to 
whether the scale items or conflict-based scenarios are reflecting beliefs more predictive 
of behavior.  Moreover, these differential responses to the two principles across scales 
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and scenarios provide further evidence for distinguishing social justice and fairness as 
distinct moral values as reflected in the Model of Moral Motives, but not in Moral 
Foundations Theory.  
Approval of the Socially Just but Unfair scenarios over both Studies 2 and 4 were still 
best predicted by political identity. In Study 2, they were also negatively correlated with 
relative social class. This was not replicated in Study 4, but there also seemed to be 
contradictory results here where participants in the abstract condition reported less 
approval of these scenarios where social justice was upheld.  
Fortunately, results related to the Fair but Socially Unjust scenarios were more 
consistent across Studies 2 and 4. In both studies, SSS and approval of these scenarios 
where social justice was violated were positively correlated to the same magnitude. In 
addition, increased approval of these scenarios was similarly predicted by higher social 
class, more conservative political identity, and lower construal level across both studies.  
In post-hoc analyses, political identity emerged as an important demographic 
predictor. More liberal participants were predictably more supportive of social justice,  
but mediation analyses also showed that this effect did not entirely explain the effect of 
social class on social justice beliefs. That is, social class appears to have had a unique 
role in influencing approval or disapproval of real-world scenarios where social justice is 
violated. And, although conservative political identity was differentially associated with 
the scale items, it was far less influential on the ratings of the scenarios as measured by 
decreased effect sizes. Moreover, there was greater variability among liberals than among 
conservatives: while conservatives were predictably and uniformly less supportive of 
social justice, liberals did not all consistently endorse social justice, suggesting that there 
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is more to understanding who supports social justice than merely political identity. Last, 
as in previous studies, the effect of political identity and social class was not as strong for 
support of fairness, which appears to be less malleable and more universal.  
The scenarios where social justice was violated (FUJ) were also where cognition 
came into play. Specifically, higher scores on the BIF but not the Kimchi-Palmer figures 
were predictive of decreased approval of these scenarios in both Studies 2 and 4. As 
mentioned earlier, the two measures are intended to capture related but slightly 
qualitatively different concepts and it appears that construal level is the more relevant 
concept over local/global thinking across all four studies. The effect represented by the 
BIF supports the hypothesis that abstract thinking may increase support for social justice 
– or, in this case, increase objections to the violation of social justice as in the FUJ 
scenarios. The present research then brings up several other questions about the 
relationship between abstract/categorical thinking and social justice. These include the 
nature of this style of thinking: is it a long-term individual difference or an effect of 
context and situation? How enduring or flexible is this style of thinking? Future research 
is warranted.  
In the regression analyses, measured construal level did not interact with any of the 
other predictive variables – particularly not with political identity. In Study 3, however, 
participants in the abstract construal level condition responded differently to the social 
justice scale items depending on their political identity: more liberal participants reported 
increased support of social justice while more conservative participants reported 
decreased support of social justice. Analyses suggested that this effect strongest for 
liberals where perhaps thinking abstractly helped strengthen beliefs they already held. 
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These differential results for measured versus manipulated construal level also suggest 
that the relationship between the construal level task and the BIF is not clear, i.e. are they 
accessing the same underlying concept? The present research could thus be expanded by 
the use of different measures and/or manipulations related to construal level that may be 
more sensitive to the specific cognitive processes surrounding thinking about social 
justice and fairness. In addition, the interaction of politics and condition is significant in 
Study 3 with scale items, but not in Study 4 with scenarios. Unlike Studies 1 and 2 where 
an image of the ladder was included with each dependent measure item to strengthen the 
manipulation, no such cue was included with these items. Therefore, it may be that the 
effect of the abstract/concrete construal level task faded with the cognitive effort required 
in processing the complex scenarios.  
Last, gender was an independent and significant effect on Fair but Unjust scenarios in 
both Studies 2 and 4 wherein females were less approving of scenarios where social 
justice was violated. This effect was not driven by difference in political identity or other 
demographic variables between the genders. One explanation for this is the notion that 
women are more sensitive to violations of social justice because they are arguably lower 
in status in a general sense, although not statistically on the SSS in these studies. 
Functionally, this moderate and consistent effect suggests that future research should 
more closely examine the role of two other concepts that are also affected by gender: 
empathy and interdependence (Varnum, et al., 2015). These may shed more light on both 
the effect of gender and the basis of support for social justice.  
Of course, the four studies presented here are limited in their scope in several ways. 
One of these is the fact that there were unequal sample sizes between the control groups 
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and experimental conditions, especially in Studies 3 and 4. This was a result of the study 
design: participants were randomly and evenly assigned to a condition immediately after 
providing consent, but more of the participants assigned to the experimental conditions 
requiring the arduous task of writing in response to a prompt ended their session with 
incomplete data, i.e., not having completed the manipulation task (these participants were 
included in the number of dropped participants in the results). Although tests, residuals, 
and histograms showed homogeneity of variance across the groups, there may be 
cognitive differences between people who continued with the study and those who 
terminated their session upon seeing the longer assignment.  
Second, the sample comes from an online pool of survey takers who tend to be 
slightly more liberal in political identity and lower in social class. Analyses on the states 
in which they resided showed that there were equal numbers of participants from “red” 
and “blue” states, but there were very few participants who indicated they belonged at the 
9- or 10-rung mark on the SSS (on average, 3 participants in each study) compared to the 
1- or 2-run mark (on average, 125 participants in each study and only about two 
participants at rung 1 in each study). A future step may be accessing a different sample 
with greater variance across the SSS ladder, especially towards the high end.  
Moreover, the majority of participants and, indeed, people, tend to consider 
themselves “middle class” and, thus, place themselves between 4 and 6 on the SSS. For 
most people, social class remains a relative concept, highly linked to social comparison 
and reference groups. Even as globalization in the present may be increasing exposure to 
the ultra-rich and/or desperately poor, this may not necessarily affect the self-concept. 
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Thus, stronger manipulations using greater perspective-taking and manipulation of the 
reference group may deliver more consistent effects.  
Simultaneously, other programs of research suggest that social class is more than just 
rank and that the sociopolitical context of class should be an important consideration 
(Stephens & Townsend, 2013). One application of this to the present work is that the 
culture of social class is more unique in and relevant to the top and bottom of the SSS 
ladder, but not so much in the middle. Such a perspective would make accessing a wider 
range of people from different class backgrounds even more imperative.  
Ultimately, just as previous research has suggested that increases in social class are 
associated with decreases in empathy, ethical behavior, and interdependence, and 
increases in essentialism, deservingness, and hierarchy, the present research would add 
decreased support for social justice to this list. This is particularly concerning in that U.S. 
society at least is moving towards greater inequality and this research suggests that the 
gap in income and resources will continue to translate into a gap in attitudes and beliefs 
about society as a whole. More understanding of the effects of social class on social 
justice can serve as a step towards understanding the maintenance of economic 
inequality, particularly by the high social class who tend to be in power. In a practical 
sense, these studies and other research that aligns with it advocate for that power to be 
systematically distributed more evenly with such efforts as more political representation 
by low-SES groups and opposition to voter-suppression efforts. In addition, low-SES and 
race are highly linked in the U.S. and although these studies did not have enough 
statistical power to test effects of and interactions with race and ethnicity, this could be an 
interesting extension of the research.  
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The present research also suggests that there is far more complexity in the answer to 
the question of who supports social justice principles in the face of conflict – social class, 
political identity, and other demographic variables may play a small role but they are by 
no means the sum of the explanation. Considering that abstract thinking played a 
particular role in determining support for social justice when in conflict with fairness, it 
may be that this question is partly answered by the extent to which one broadly defines a 
community or a larger society to include people unlike themselves. The relationship 
between abstract thinking and scenarios in which social justice is violated to uphold 
fairness is a particularly interesting avenue of future research. More involved scenarios or 
a different measure/manipulation of abstract thinking may be able to better demonstrate 
the underlying effect. Other minor results also suggest that the model presented here is 
incomplete; empathy or interdependence may serve greater functions than the literature 
suggests and these deserve exploration.  
Furthermore, if social justice is a form of principlism, a reliable and rational 
motivation to uphold a moral principle, then understanding the antecedents of social 
justice and fairness, beyond the constraints of social class and self-interest, is critical to 
alleviating the large-scale and pernicious effects of socioeconomic inequality. In general, 
the results of these studies suggest that social class and abstract thinking play significant 
and independent roles in determining who supports social justice in the face of conflict. 
Moving forward, exploring the ways in which social class and abstract thinking affect our 
perceptions of the people and communities around us would allow us to gain a better 
understanding of moral attitudes towards socioeconomic inequality.  
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Table 1: Study 1 Means & Standard Deviations 
 
 
Table 2: Study 1 ANOVA tables  
 
 
Table 3: Study 1 Means by Conditions 
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Table 4: Study 1 Correlations 
 
 
Table 5: Study 1 Multiple Regression of Fairness on SSS and Kimchi-Palmer Figures 
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Table 6: Study 1 Multiple Regression of Fairness on SSS and BIF 
 
 
Table 7: Study 1 Multiple Regression of Social Justice on SSS and BIF
 
 
Table 8: Study 1 Multiple Regression of Social Justice on SSS and Kimchi-Palmer 
figures 
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Table 9: Study 1 Partial Correlations Table
 
 
 
Table 10: Study 1 Multiple Regression of Social Justice on SSS and Political Identity  
 
 
Table 11: Study 1 Multiple Regression of Fairness on SSS and Political Identity  
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Table 12: Study 2 Means & Standard Deviations 
 
 
Table 13: Study 2 ANOVA of SSS by condition 
 
 
Table 14: Study 2 MANOVA of scenarios by condition 
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Table 15: Study 2 Correlations 
 
 
Table 16: Study 2 Multiple Regression of JUF scenarios on SSS and Kimchi-Palmer task 
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Table 17: Study 2 Multiple Regression of JUF scenarios on SSS and BIF 
 
 
Table 18: Study 2 Multiple Regression of FUJ scenarios on SSS and Kimchi-Palmer task
 
 
Table 19: Study 2 Multiple Regression of FUJ scenarios on SSS and BIF 
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Table 20: Study 2 Partial Correlations 
 
 
 
Table 21: Study 2 ANCOVA  
 
 
Table 22: Study 2 MANCOVA 
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Table 23: Study 2 Multiple regression on JUF scenarios  
 
 
 
Table 24: Study 2 Multiple Regression on FUJ scenarios 
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Table 25: Study 3 Means and Standard Deviations 
 
 
Table 26: Study 3 ANOVA 
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Table 27: Study 3 Pearson’s Correlations 
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Table 28: Study 3 Spearman’s Correlations 
 
 
 
Table 29: Study 3 Multiple Regression on Social Justice by SSS and BIF 
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Table 30: Study 3 Multiple Regression on Fairness by SSS and BIF 
 
 
Table 31: Study 3 ANCOVA on Social Justice by Condition/Politics 
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Table 32: Study 3 Multiple Regression on Social Justice 
 
Table 33: Study 3 Multiple Regression on Fairness  
 
 
Table 34: Study 4 Means & SDs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 111 
 
 
Table 35: Study 4 MANOVA scenarios by condition 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 36: Study 4 Correlations  
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Table 37: Study 4 Multiple Regression on JUF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 38: Study 4 Multiple Regression on FUJ 
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Table 39: Study 4 MANCOVA condition and politics on scenarios 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 40: Study 4 Multiple Regression on FUJ ratings 
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Table 41: Study 4 Multiple Regression on JUF ratings 
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Figure 1: Study 1 Partial Mediation of Social Class and Social Justice by Politics (34%) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Study 2 Partial Mediation of Social Class and FUJ scenarios by Politics (28%) 
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Figure 3: Study 3 Politics by Condition interaction on Social Justice (Condition 2 = 
Abstract) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 117 
 
Figure 4: Study 4 Effect of Condition on Scenarios 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A 
FAIRNESS SCALE 
 
 (Revised Preference for Merit Principle Scale) 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each o the following 
statements by circling the appropriate number on the scale below.  Items are to be rated 
on a seven-point scale with the following anchors: (1) strongly disagree (2) moderately 
disagree (3) slightly disagree (4) neither agree nor disagree (5) slightly agree (6) 
moderately agree and (7) strongly agree. 
 
1. In society, people who do a good job ought to rise to the top. 
2. The effort a person puts into something ought to be reflected in the size of the reward 
he or she receives.  
3. Members of a team ought to receive different rewards depending on the amount each 
person contributed.  
4. Between two equally smart people, the one who is the harder worker ought to always 
be rewarded more.  
5. If every person in a group has the same abilities, rewards ought to be given to the 
person who puts in the most effort. 
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APPENDIX B 
SOCIAL JUSTICE SCALE 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each o the following 
statements by circling the appropriate number on the scale below.  Items are to be rated 
on a seven-point scale with the following anchors: (1) strongly disagree (2) moderately 
disagree (3) slightly disagree (4) neither agree nor disagree (5) slightly agree (6) 
moderately agree and (7) strongly agree. 
 
1. It is our responsibility, not just a matter of personal preference, to provide for 
groups worse off in society. 
2. It is important for those who are better off to help provide resources for the most 
vulnerable members of society. 
3. In the healthiest societies, those at the top should feel responsible for improving 
the well-being of those at the bottom. 
4. Increased economic equality is ultimately beneficial to everyone in society. 
5. Helping those at the bottom of society will not discourage them from working 
harder. 
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APPENDIX C 
MACARTHUR SCALE OF SUBJECTIVE SES 
(Adler, Epel, Castellazzo & Ickovics, 2000) 
 
Manipulation (Piff, et al., 2010) 
“Now, please compare yourself to the people at the very bottom [top] of the 
ladder. These are people who are the worst [best] off—those who have the least 
[most] money, least [most] education, and the least [most] respected jobs. In 
particular, we’d like you to think about how you are different from these people in 
terms of your own income, educational history, and job status. Where would you 
place yourself on this ladder relative to these people at the very bottom [top]?  
o To strengthen the manipulation, participants are instructed to write about a 
hypothetical interaction with a person from the bottom or top of the 
ladder. Participants then indicate their own standing on the ladder; the 
bottom rung is coded as “1,” and the top rung is coded as “10.” 
 121 
 
APPENDIX D 
SCENARIOS 
Fairness Scenarios 
1. In a city neighborhood, parents donate a great deal of money to their children’s 
public school. Other public schools in the city with lower income families get no 
additional funds from parents. 
2. Students at a respected college are admitted solely on the basis of their academic 
merit - a combination of students’ grade point average and their SAT scores. 
Students who were not afforded the opportunity to have a high-quality education 
are unlikely to be admitted. 
3. A popular company provides experience to students through valuable, unpaid 
summer internships. Students who must earn money over the summer are not at 
liberty to accept unpaid internships.  
4. A public school encourages students to join others in field learning outside of the 
classroom for a small travel fee. Students from low-income families are not able 
to pay the fee and, thus, are left behind. 
5. A university offers admission into an exclusive honors program, with smaller 
classes and greater networking opportunities, which results in increased tuition 
levels. Students from low-income families are not able to take advantage of these 
opportunities, regardless of how qualified they may be.  
 
Social Justice Scenarios 
1. A very successful state-funded program has been established for special needs 
children who are also from underserved communities. Some parents with special 
needs children want to send their children to the successful program, but cannot 
because they are not from an under-served community. 
2. Top colleges are engaging in major recruitment efforts at low income high 
schools to increase interest and applications from these students. Students at 
private high schools are now receiving less attention from top colleges. 
3. Students at a major university are admitted based on a combination of factors, 
including, in particular, past hardship, and group membership. Some students with 
better academic records are not admitted to the university. 
4. In a new urban housing development, rent does not increase for its low-income 
tenants when the market for real estate changes. The rest of the city’s tenants must 
pay increased rent as market prices for real estate increase.   
5. A highly valued job training program is offered to people from typically 
underserved areas of the city. People who may benefit from the program, but do 
not reside in those underserved areas, are not able to participate.  
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APPENDIX E 
KIMCHI-PALMER FIGURES 
 
(Kimchi & Palmer, 1982) Stimuli (1-8) will be randomized in presentation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
   
  
Shape 3 
Shape 2 
Shape 5 
Shape 7 
Shape 4 
Shape 6 
Shape 8 
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APPENDIX F 
BEHAVIOR IDENTIFICATION FORM 
 
(Vallacher & Wegner, 1989) 
Any behavior can be described in many ways. For example, one person might describe a 
behavior as "writing a paper," while another person might describe the same behavior as 
"pushing keys on the keyboard." Yet another person might describe it as "expressing 
thoughts." This form focuses on your personal preferences for how a number of different 
behaviors should be described. Below you will find several behaviors listed. After each 
behavior will be two different ways in which the behavior might be identified. 
For example: 
1. Attending class 
o sitting in a chair 
o looking at a teacher 
 
Your task is to choose the identification, a or b, that best describes the behavior for you. 
Simply place a checkmark next to the option you prefer. Be sure to respond to every item. 
Please mark only one alternative for each pair. Remember, mark the description that you 
personally believe is more appropriate for each pair. 
 
Sweeping the floor 
- Moving a broom 
- Being clean* 
Attending a family reunion 
- Going to a picnic 
- Respecting tradition* 
Skydiving 
- Jumping out of airplane 
- Demonstrating one’s daringness* 
Making an expensive purchase 
- Swiping a credit card 
- Doing something for one’s pleasure* 
Staying home to study 
- Reviewing one’s notes 
- Exerting self-discipline* 
Recycling 
- Bagging paper, glass, and cans 
- Caring for the environment* 
Teaching 
- Talking to students 
- Having authority* 
Meeting new people 
- Small talk and shaking hands 
- Enhancing one’s social network* 
* Higher level alternative is the second option, but should be randomized in presentation 
Total score is the sum of higher level alternative choices.  
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APPENDIX G 
DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY 
 
Religion 
1. To what extent do you consider yourself a religious person?  
(Scale from 1 to 7; 1 = not at all religious, 7 = very religious) 
 
2. How important a role does religion play in your life? 
(Scale from 1 to 7; 1 = not at all important, 7 = very important) 
 
 
Politics 
1. Where would you place yourself on this scale? 
(Scale from 1 to 7; 1 = strong democrat, 7 = strong republican) 
 
2. Where would you place yourself on this scale? 
(Scale from 1 to 7; 1 = very liberal, 7 = very conservative) 
 
Ethnicity 
White – Black – Hispanic/Latino/a – Asian/Pacific Islander –  
American Indian/Alaskan Native – Multiethnic – Other 
 
Age 
Open-ended response 
 
Gender 
Male – Female – Prefer not to disclose 
 
Educational Attainment 
Please check the category that describes the level of education you have achieved.  
Credentials: 0 = did not complete high school, 1 = GED, 2 = high school diploma, 3 = 
postsecondary vocational certificate, 4 = associate’s degree, 5 = bachelor’s degree, 6 = 
master’s degree, 7 = doctoral degree (Ph.D., JD., M.D.). 
 
Income 
Please check the category that tells us your approximate total family income for one 
typical calendar year. Consider all sources of income, including earnings, welfare cash 
assistance, child support alimonies, support from other members of your household who 
regularly contribute to your household, etc.  
______ Less than $10,000      ______ $10,001 to $15,000 ______ $15,001 to $25,000 
______ $25,001 to $50,000    ______$50,001 to $75,000   ______$75,001 to $100,000 
______$100,001 to $150,000 ______$150,001 to $300,000   
______$300,001 to $750,000 ______ more than $750,000. 
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Occupational Prestige 
Currently, what is your main occupation or job title? Please be specific and include your 
industry. If you are currently unemployed, please indicate as such, and then include your 
previous occupation.  
 
Open-ended response. Responses will be coded based on the following codes in the 
Hollingshead Four-Factor Index of Socioeconomic Status (Hollingshead, 1975). 
  
9=higher executive, proprietor of large businesses, major professional 
8=administrators, lesser professionals, proprietor of medium-sized business 
7=smaller business owners, farm owners, managers, minor professionals 
6=technicians, semi-professionals, small business owners (business valued at $50,000-
70,000),  
5=clerical and sales workers, small farm and business owners (business valued at 
$25,000-50,000),  
4=smaller business owners (<$25,000), skilled manual laborers, craftsmen, tenant 
farmers,  
3=machine operators and semi-skilled workers,  
2=unskilled workers, 
1=farm laborers, menial service workers, students, housewives, (dependent on welfare, 
no regular occupation),  
0=not applicable or unknown.  
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APPENDIX H 
CONSTRUAL LEVEL TASK 
 
(Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006) 
 
Abstract Directions: 
Please read the following list of 20 words. Using the blank next to each word, please type 
an answer to the following question. 
__________ is an example of what? 
 
Concrete Directions: 
Please read the following list of 20 words. Using the blank next to each word, please type 
an answer to the following question. 
An example of __________ is what? 
 
Neutral Directions: 
Please read the following list of 20 words. 
 
List of 20 words: 
Singer 
King 
Pasta 
Car 
Soap 
Dog 
Book 
Family 
Soda 
Shoes 
Lamp 
Tree 
Sandwich 
Doctor 
Shark 
Hat 
Screwdriver 
Paint 
City 
Bag 
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